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Bizarre Love Triangle: 
The Spending Clause, Section 1983, 
and Medicaid Entitlements 
Nicole Huberfeld∗ 
The first two terms of the Roberts Court signal a willingness to revisit 
precedent, even decisions that have been considered long-settled, and the 
United States Supreme Court may be ready to reinterpret another area of 
jurisprudence:  the private enforcement of conditions on federal spending 
against states through actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The most recent 
pre-Roberts Court precedent is Gonzaga University v. Doe, a 2002 
decision that made it more difficult for individuals harmed by violations of 
federal laws to enforce rights through § 1983 actions.  Federal courts have 
inconsistently and confusingly applied the Gonzaga framework, but the 
Rehnquist Court would not revisit the rule. 
Last term, however, the Roberts Court granted a petition for writ of 
certiorari that would have required reconsidering Gonzaga.  Before it 
could be heard on the merits, the respondents mooted the case, but 
petitions for certiorari regularly arise in similar Medicaid enforcement 
cases.  Thus, Gonzaga could be revisited in the context of enforcement of 
Medicaid statutory entitlements.  Medicaid does not contain an 
enforcement mechanism, but the Supreme Court has facilitated 
enforcement of federal statutory rights against state officers through § 
1983.  However, this paper highlights recent events that increase the 
fragility of Medicaid. 
The first part of this paper explores the structure of Medicaid and key 
provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 that could change Medicaid 
from a program of promised care and benefits into one of no enforceable 
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promises.  The second part of this paper discusses Supreme Court 
decisions that reveal hostility to enforcement of conditions on spending 
legislation by beneficiaries under § 1983.  This part also explores how 
changes in the Court’s composition may allow this view to become the 
prevailing rule.  Additionally, this section demonstrates the narrowing 
ability of individuals to enforce Medicaid entitlements through § 1983 due 
to two distinct but related splits in the circuit courts.  The final part of this 
paper analyzes the Court’s hostility to enforcing conditions on spending by 
§ 1983 and proposes legislative responses to the possible demise of the 
Medicaid entitlement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Roberts Court’s first two terms indicate a willingness to revisit 
precedent, including decisions that have been considered long-settled.1  
The United States Supreme Court can signal intent both by the 
petitions for certiorari that it grants and those that it denies, but it 
appears that the Court is poised to reinterpret another area of 
jurisprudence2:  the private enforcement of conditions on federal 
spending against states through claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(“§ 1983”).3  The most recent precedent on point is Gonzaga 
University v. Doe, a 2002 decision that made it more difficult for 
individuals harmed by violations of federal laws to enforce statutory 
rights through § 1983 claims.4  Federal circuit and district courts have 
inconsistently and confusingly applied the Gonzaga framework,5 
which was supposed to clarify private causes of action under § 1983.  
The Rehnquist Court, however, was not interested in revisiting the 
Gonzaga rule.6   
Last term, in contrast, the Roberts Court granted a petition for writ 
of certiorari to Arkansas and its Medicaid officials that would have 
 
 1 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 
2765 (2007) (relying on Brown v. Board of Education as precedent to prevent grade 
school integration based in part on racial integration); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2169 (2007) (providing novel interpretation of starting 
point for Title VII workplace discrimination claim); Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 
1610, 1635-37 (2007) (upholding Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 despite lack 
of exception to ban for health of mother, contrary to all prior expressions of liberty 
interest at issue in abortion rights cases). 
 2 See infra notes 7-12 and accompanying text. 
 3 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) [hereinafter “§ 1983”]. 
 4 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002).  Though little-noticed at the time the Court issued its 
decision, the case has become a source of confusion in the lower federal courts and of 
controversy among scholars.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Limiting Suits to Enforce Federal 
Laws, 39 JAN. TRIAL 70, 70 (2003) (noting that Gonzaga would limit plaintiffs’ ability 
to bring § 1983 actions and that Chief Justice Rehnquist was quoted at conference 
calling Gonzaga important “sleeper decision”); see also TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, 
DISENTITLEMENT?:  THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A 
RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 96 (2003) (noting Gonzaga Court’s skepticism regarding 
enforcing Spending Clause conditions by § 1983 causes of action). 
 5 See infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text. 
 6 See Sasha Samberg-Champion, How to Read Gonzaga:  Laying the Seeds of a 
Coherent Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1838, 1839 (2003) (noting 
that Court rejected number of petitions for certiorari that would have facilitated 
revisiting confusion created by Gonzaga). 
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required the Court to revisit Gonzaga.7  Before it could be heard on the 
merits, however, the respondents voluntarily mooted the case after a 
conversation with the Solicitor General.8  Nevertheless, petitions for 
certiorari regularly arise in similar Medicaid enforcement cases.9  
Though the Court recently rejected a petition for certiorari from the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and two petitions from the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals,10 denials that support decisions by the 
circuits to “close the courthouse doors” to Medicaid enrollees,11 the 
Court will likely take up the issue again in the near future.12 
Thus, the context in which the Court could revisit Gonzaga is the 
enforcement of Medicaid statutory entitlements via § 1983.13  
Medicaid does not contain a federal enforcement mechanism for 
individuals who do not receive the benefits promised by their states as 
 
 7 See Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 3000, 3000 (2007) 
(granting writ and disposing of case by summary action). 
 8 See generally Petitioners’ Response to Respondents’ Suggestion of Mootness at 2-3, 
Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1356 (June 11, 2007) (No. 06-415) 
(describing that parties met with Solicitor General’s office after filing their briefs, after 
which respondents voluntarily dismissed their case); Posting of Lyle Denniston to 
SCOTUSblog, Case on Children’s Health Benefits May End, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/ 
(June 12, 2007, 14:26 EST) (noting that clinics, treatment centers, children and parents 
decided to dismiss case as moot). 
 9 See generally Kidd v. Doe, 501 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 
1483 (2008) (denying writ of certiorari because respondents waived right to file 
response brief in case). 
 10 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Okla. Chapter of the Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. 
Fogarty, No. 06-1482 (10th Cir. May 7, 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 68 (2007). 
 11 Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors to Civil Rights Litigants, 5 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 537, 539 (2003) (describing trend in Rehnquist Court decisions of 
narrowing civil rights litigants’ access to courts). 
 12 A petition for certiorari on the Supreme Court’s 2007-2008 Appellate Docket 
was not addressed in the 2008 term, but the Court denied the petition early in the 
2009 term.  See Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, No. 07-1160 (5th Cir. Mar. 
12, 2008), http://origin.www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/07-1160.htm. 
 13 See Petitioners’ Response to Respondents’ Suggestion of Mootness at 2-3, Selig, 
127 S. Ct. 1356 (No. 06-415) (vacating judgment in lower courts and directing 
dismissal for mootness).  Then-Judge Alito, concurring in the decision of Sabree v. 
Richman, a Third Circuit case that allowed Medicaid enrollees to enforce individual 
federal rights to Medicaid services under § 1983, provided insight into his position on 
the use of § 1983 to enforce Medicaid entitlements:  “While the analysis and decision 
of the District Court may reflect the direction that future Supreme Court cases in this area 
will take, currently binding precedent supports the decision of the Court.  I therefore 
concur in the Court’s decision.”  367 F.3d 180, 194 (2004) (emphasis added).  Judge 
Alito was agreeing, indirectly, with the district court judge who found that Medicaid 
was a cooperative federal-state program that did not provide the kind of rights that are 
enforceable through § 1983 actions.  See Sabree v. Houston, 245 F. Supp. 2d 653, 660-
61 (E.D. Pa. 2003). 
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required by federal guidelines.14  For decades, this omission was not 
overwhelmingly problematic, as the Supreme Court facilitated 
enforcement of federal statutory rights against state officers through § 
1983.15  Indeed, the sheer quantity of lower federal court cases might 
lead the casual observer to believe that Medicaid providers and 
enrollees have a firm foundation to enforce Medicaid entitlements 
through § 1983 claims.16  This paper, however, contends that 
Medicaid is metamorphosing into a right without a remedy due to 
federal courts’ inconsistent interpretation of § 1983.17  
Recent events reveal the fragility of the § 1983 enforcement 
mechanism.  First, various currently-sitting Justices have displayed 
skepticism regarding private parties’ ability to enforce conditions on 
spending through § 1983; this doubt appears to be supported by a 
majority now that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito are on the 
Court.18  Second, a circuit divide exists regarding how to apply 
Gonzaga to Medicaid entitlements.  This split is exacerbated by a 
newly popular theory adopted by a few circuits that the phrase 
“medical assistance” in the Medicaid Act merely requires states to pay, 
 
 14 Though Medicaid does contain an administrative process for simple claims denial, 
see 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (2006); 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.151-.154, 431.200-.245 (2008), 
and a notification process for denial of eligibility, see 42 C.F.R. § 435.911 (2008); see 
also Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Tenuous Nature of the Medicaid Entitlement, 22 HEALTH 
AFFAIRS 145, 145-46 (2003) (describing lack of access to federal courts for Medicaid 
enrollees); Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty:  Revisiting Structure and Meaning in a 
Post-Deficit Reduction Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 23-24 (2006) (noting that 
unlike Medicare and ERISA, Medicaid contains no federal cause of action). 
 15 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 1 (1980); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).  
Section 1983 creates the cause of action for violations of federal law under color of 
state law; Ex parte Young allows state officers to be sued for injunctive relief under § 
1983 by holding that state officers are not the state for purposes of sovereign 
immunity, thereby avoiding 11th Amendment issues.  See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 
123, 156 (1908). 
 16 See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text; see also Jost, supra note 14, at 
148 n.21.  Professor Jost provided statistics regarding Medicaid enrollees’ and 
providers’ § 1983 lawsuits for 1999 and 2000:  in 1999, 
recipients and providers prevailed in 53[%] of the reported federal court 
cases that they brought against Medicaid programs, while in 2000 they won 
48[%] of these cases.  Recipients were more successful than providers, 
prevailing 61[%] of the time in suits in 1999 and 2000, while providers 
prevailed only 35[%] of the time in 1999 and 38[%] in 2000.   
Id. at 148.  In the accompanying footnote, Professor Jost notes both enrollees and 
healthcare providers were less successful upon appeal, “where state Medicaid agencies 
won 83[%] of the reported cases in 1999 and 81[%] in 2000.”  Id. at 148 n.21. 
 17 See Samberg-Champion, supra note 6, at 1884. 
 18 See discussion infra Part III. 
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not to provide care or services.19  Finally, the Deficit Reduction Act of 
2005 turns long-standing premises of Medicaid upside down by 
allowing states to provide the “actuarial equivalent” of benefits that 
heretofore were mandated by federal law.20 
This paper will explore the contours of these trends in turn.  The 
first part will review the structure of Medicaid and examine key 
provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 that change Medicaid 
from a program of promised care and benefits into one of no 
enforceable promises.  The second part of this paper will discuss the 
trends in federal court decisions regarding enforcement of federal 
spending statutes through § 1983 that reveal hostility to enforcement 
by beneficiaries of federal spending.  This part also will explore how 
changes in the Court’s composition may allow this view, previously 
expressed as dicta, to become the prevailing rule.  Additionally, this 
part will demonstrate the narrowing ability of individuals — both 
patients and healthcare providers — to enforce Medicaid entitlements 
through § 1983 due to two distinct but related splits in the circuit 
courts.  The final part of this paper will analyze the Court’s resistance 
to enforcing § 1983’s conditions on spending, which diminishes both 
individual rights and federal power.  This part will conclude by 
proposing legislative responses. 
I. MEDICAID — A FRAGILE RIGHT WITH A DIMINISHING REMEDY 
Congress enacted Medicaid in 1965 as companion legislation to 
Medicare.21  Congress structured Medicaid as a federal welfare 
program, meaning it was a temporary source of help when people 
became “medically indigent.”  Medicaid augmented the welfare system 
and eased states’ budgetary issues.22  As such, Medicaid’s funding 
derives from general tax revenue rather than the payroll tax that helps 
to fund Medicare, a structural aspect of Medicaid that causes ongoing 
political vulnerability.23  Medicaid was never designed to provide 
assistance to all Americans who could not afford medical care; instead, 
the program allows only the “deserving poor” to enroll for its 
 
 19 See infra Part III.B. 
 20 Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 6044 120 Stat. 4 (2006). 
 21 See ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA:  A 
CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID 47-51 (1974) (describing Medicaid as “ill-designed” 
compared to Medicare). 
 22 See id. at 53. 
 23 See id. (describing one of driving forces of Medicaid as desire to help remove 
people from welfare roles, not to assist those who could not afford healthcare as 
philosophical matter); see also JOST, supra note 4, at 15-17, 271. 
  
2008] Bizarre Love Triangle 419 
benefits.24  Although Medicaid currently covers about fifty-five million 
Americans, eligibility limitations restrict the program to only about 
forty percent of the poor and near-poor.25  Medicaid covers people 
who are blind, disabled, elderly, and pregnant, as well as children (and 
their families) who meet a certain poverty level set by statutorily-
defined percentages of the federal poverty line.26  Courts have 
traditionally treated Medicaid as a statutory entitlement for those who 
rely on it.27  Medicaid is not perfect (or philosophically coherent),28 
but it is indispensable as the most consistent device that ensures 
access to healthcare for underprivileged populations.29 
Medicaid is a classic example of cooperative federalism;30 in the 
federal statutory scheme creating the Medicaid program (referred to as 
the “Medicaid Act”31), the federal government promises federal money 
to the states in exchange for states’ promise to fulfill certain conditions 
on those funds by providing medical assistance to mandatory categories 
of people.32  The state must submit a “State plan” to participate in 
 
 24 See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 57; see also Mary Ann Bobinski & 
Phyllis Griffin Epps, Women, Poverty, Access to Health Care, and the Perils of Symbolic 
Reform, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 233, 248 n.92 (2002) (noting that, contrary to 
popular perception, Medicaid covers only certain categories of poor). 
 25 See KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID:  A PRIMER 3 
(2005), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/7334.cfm.  See generally KAISER COMM’N ON 
MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE MEDICAID PROGRAM AT A GLANCE (2007), 
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7235-02.pdf  (describing Medicaid program in 
basic terms and noting limitations that make it so that Medicaid covers less than half 
of population). 
 26 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10)(A) (2006). 
 27 Arguing for an entitlement program that covers all Americans, Professor Jost 
notes that “entitlements to health-care coverage may not guarantee health-care 
services at all if those rights are not legally enforceable, even if the state provides these 
services directly . . . .”  JOST, supra note 4, at 270. 
 28 See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 53. 
 29 See Rosenbaum, supra note 14, at 6. 
 30 See, e.g., Wis. Dept. of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 495 
(2002) (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980)) (stating that Medicaid Act 
fosters cooperative federalism and describing program).  Typically, when states are 
required to spend state government funds to create programs that are co-founded and 
funded by the federal government within the structure called cooperative federalism, 
the funds are spent on a program that the state controls according to federal 
guidelines.  If the state does not like the federal government’s guidelines, it need not 
accept federal money and thus either self-funds or does not institute the program.  See 
also Elizabeth A. Weeks, Cooperative Federalism and Healthcare Reform:  The Medicare 
Part D “Clawback” Example, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 79, 94 (2007). 
 31  42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (2006). 
 32 42 U.S.C. § 1396a.  Medicaid is the largest grant of federal funds to the states, 
by some estimates accounting for nearly 40% of all federal dollars received by states.  
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Medicaid, which contains mandatory and optional elements.33  Thus, 
the Medicaid Act contains language describing medical assistance — a 
term that refers to Medicaid itself — as an entitlement for enrollees.  
The entitlement for funds to create medical assistance extends to the 
state, healthcare providers who treat Medicaid patients, and Medicaid 
enrollees.34  Importantly, states must provide at least as much as the 
federal government requires in the conditions on its funds, but states 
cannot provide less than the federal Medicaid statutes and regulations 
order.35  States also can fulfill the demands for State plans by obtaining 
waiver approval from the Secretary of the Department of Health and 
Human Services (“DHHS”) for a managed care version of Medicaid 
rather than a fee-for-service format.36 
 
See Bipartisan Comm. on the Medicaid Act of 2005, H.R. 985, 109th Cong. § 2(13) 
(2005) (stating as part of its findings that:  “Medicaid is the single largest Federal 
grant-in-aid program to the States, accounting for over 40[%] of all Federal grants to 
States.”). 
 33 42 U.S.C. § 1396a. 
 34 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(d) (describing amount of federal funds to which 
state is “entitled”); 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(k) (describing federal assistance available for 
calculating managed care benefits for individuals “entitled to” Medicaid); 42 U.S.C. § 
1396e (describing guidelines for creating group health plans for individuals “entitled” 
to Medicaid); see also JOST, supra note 4, at 32 and attendant endnotes (conveying list 
of provisions within 42 U.S.C. § 1396 that contain word “entitle”). 
 35 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (“A State plan for medical assistance must . . . .”) 
(emphasis added); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii) (stating that “at the option of the 
State” certain other categories of people can be covered); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) (“The 
Secretary shall approve any plan which fulfills the conditions specified in subsection 
(a) . . . .”).  Additional services also can receive matching funds.  See 42 U.S.C. § 
1396d(a); see also ANDY SCHNEIDER, RISA ELIAS, RACHEL GARFIELD, DAVID ROUSSEAU & 
VICTORIA WACHINO, THE MEDICAID RESOURCE BOOK, KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID 
AND THE UNINSURED 57 (2002), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/2236-index.cfm. 
 36 42 U.S.C. § 1396n.  The first version of the Medicaid waiver was § 1915(b) 
waivers, passed as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 1396n (Social Security Act § 1915).  The second type of waiver, a § 1115 
waiver, allowed state experimentation to cover the uninsured without increasing costs 
to the federal government.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2000) (Social Security Act § 
1115(a)).  The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 allowed states to simply amend their State 
plans to implement managed care rather than requiring them to seek waivers.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 1396u-2.  Some studies have shown that increased flexibility through waivers 
for managed care and other programs decreases the level of care for Medicaid 
enrollees.  See, e.g., Dayna Bowen Matthew, The “New Federalism” Approach to 
Medicaid:  Empirical Evidence That Ceding Inherently Federal Authority to the States 
Harms Public Health, 90 KY. L.J. 973, 974-75, 982 (2002) (providing evidence that 
increased state control of Medicaid leads to worse access to and provision of 
healthcare for poor). 
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A key defining feature of Medicaid has been the equal coverage that 
it provides enrollees.37  By federal law, if a person qualifies for 
Medicaid in terms of poverty level and categorical eligibility, then that 
person must not only receive relatively prompt Medicaid coverage but 
also the same medical assistance as every other person in that category 
of eligibility.38  Accordingly, each pregnant woman who qualifies for 
Medicaid receives the same services; each blind person who qualifies 
for Medicaid receives the same services; and each child who qualifies 
for Medicaid receives the same services.  The promised equal benefits 
have been called, in short form, “comparability” (all enrollees within a 
category of eligibility must have access to the same items and 
services),39 “statewideness” (the State plan must be in effect in all 
political subdivisions of the state),40 “freedom of choice” (enrollees 
must be able to choose which healthcare provider treats them),41 and 
“assurance of transportation” to medically necessary services.42  The 
federal statutes and regulations that mandate baseline Medicaid 
benefits require states to provide minimal medical assistance, a 
promise of certain specified benefits that is unique.43  This is the 
“defined benefit approach” of Medicaid.44  The equal access, equal 
coverage aspect of Medicaid has been the basis for enrollees’ 
enforcement of Medicaid’s entitlements through § 1983, discussed in 
greater detail below.45 
States traditionally have had leeway in structuring State plans, but 
they often seek more flexibility in Medicaid.  The latest effort to give 
 
 37 42 U.S.C. § 1396a. 
 38 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(8), (a)(10).   
 39 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B). 
 40 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1). 
 41 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23). 
 42 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(70); 42 C.F.R. § 431.53 (2008); see also CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICAID AT-A-GLANCE 2005:  A MEDICAID 
INFORMATION SOURCE 11 (2005), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidGenInfo/ 
Downloads/MedicaidAtAGlance2005.pdf. 
 43 See Rosenbaum, supra note 14, at 13. 
 44 See id. at 40-41.  Professor Rosenbaum writes: 
Under a defined benefit approach, the [Medicaid] entitlement consists of an 
entitlement to coverage encompassing a broad array of specified benefits; 
indeed, the detailed nature of benefit specification is such that much of the 
Medicaid litigation that has taken place over the past four decades has 
focused on the enforcement of federal coverage rights in terms of benefit 
class and amount, duration, and scope. 
Id. at 41. 
 45 See infra Part III.B. 
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states more flexibility was encompassed in the Deficit Reduction Act 
of 2005 (“the DRA”), which begins to morph Medicaid from a defined 
benefit program into a defined contribution program.46  Section 6044 
of the DRA, also called the “Benchmark Provision,” allows states to 
modify their State plans so that they provide what is called 
“benchmark coverage.”47  Benchmark coverage essentially permits 
states to enroll Medicaid beneficiaries in non-Medicaid managed care 
plans, which by definition includes the Federal Employee Health 
Benefit Program, state employee health benefit programs, or any plan 
already offered by a major health maintenance organization in the 
state.48  Benchmark coverage, according to the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) draft regulations, is intended to afford 
“[s]tates unprecedented flexibility within Medicaid State Plans to 
provide health benefits coverage.”49  This “unprecedented flexibility” 
led CMS to draft the interpretive regulations so that comparability, 
statewideness, freedom of choice, and the assurance of transportation 
are not required of a state that has amended its State plan to include 
benchmark coverage.50  Also, states can force a large portion of the 
Medicaid population to enroll in benchmark coverage and can provide 
different benefits within eligibility categories, though the DRA excepts 
some of the particularly vulnerable and short-term categories of 
 
 46 See Rosenbaum, supra note 14, at 40-41.  President Bush sought to transform 
Medicaid into a block-grant program as part of the DRA but was not successful.  See 
Jeanne M. Lambrew, Making Medicaid a Block Grant Program:  An Analysis of the 
Implications of Past Proposals, 83 MILBANK Q. 41, 46-47 (2005). 
 47 Section 6044, “State flexibility in benefit packages,” provides the following 
regarding modification of State plans: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, a State, at its option as a 
State plan amendment, may provide for medical assistance under this title to 
individuals within one or more groups of individuals specified by the State 
through enrollment in coverage that provides — (i) benchmark coverage 
described in subsection (b)(1) or benchmark equivalent coverage described 
in subsection (b)(2); and (ii) for any child under 19 years of age who is 
covered under the State plan under section 1902(a)(10)(A), wrap-around 
benefits to the benchmark coverage or benchmark equivalent coverage 
consisting of early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services 
defined in section 1905(r). 
42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 48 Id. § 1396u-7(b)(1). 
 49 73 Fed. Reg. 9714, 9715 (Feb. 22, 2008). 
 50 See id. at 9715, 9718, 9721, 9727. 
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enrollees, such as those eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid 
(“dual eligibles”).51   
In addition, states now have the option to provide “benchmark 
equivalent coverage,” which also relieves the states of traditional 
mandatory services, comparability, statewideness, freedom of choice, 
and the assurance of transportation requirements.52  Benchmark 
equivalent coverage is defined minimally compared to the lists of 
services and items traditionally required by the Medicaid Act.  States 
must cover inpatient and outpatient hospital care, physician services, 
laboratory and x-ray services, well-baby care, and immunizations,53 and 
those services must be supplied by the “actuarial equivalent” of the 
listed benchmark coverage providers.54  Benchmark equivalent coverage 
 
 51 The statute provides: 
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), a State may require that a full-
benefit eligible individual . . . within a group obtain benefits under this title 
through enrollment in coverage . . . . A State may apply the previous 
sentence to individuals within [one] or more groups of such individuals. . . . 
A State may not require . . . an individual to obtain benefits through 
enrollment . . . if the individual is within one of the following categories of 
individuals:  (i) Mandatory pregnant women . . . , (ii) Blind or disabled 
individuals . . . , (iii) Dual eligibles . . . , (iv) Terminally ill hospice 
patients . . . , (v) Eligible on basis of institutionalization . . . , (vi) Medically 
frail and special medical needs individuals . . . , (vii) Beneficiaries qualifying 
for long-term care services . . . , (viii) Children in foster care receiving child 
welfare services and children receiving foster care or adoption 
assistance . . . , (ix) TANF and section 1396u-1 parents . . . , (x) Women in 
the breast or cervical cancer program . . . , [or] (xi) Limited services 
beneficiaries. . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 52 See id.; see also id. § 1396u-7(a)(1), (b)(2).  The statute defines benchmark 
equivalent coverage as: 
The coverage includes benefits for items and services within each of the 
following categories of basic services: 
(i) Inpatient and outpatient hospital services. 
(ii) Physicians’ surgical and medical services. 
(iii) Laboratory and x-ray services. 
(iv) Well-baby and well-child care, including age-appropriate immunizations. 
(v) Other appropriate preventive services, as designated by the Secretary. 
Id. § 1396u-7(b)(2). 
 53 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b)(2). 
 54 The statute provides that a benchmark equivalent 
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essentially allows states to supply money for payment of premiums 
rather than a well-defined healthcare program.  Instead of carefully 
planned, statutorily-designed care and services, states can pay a private 
insurer who does not have to comply with the Medicaid Act.55 
Thus, the federal government has given states “unprecedented 
flexibility”56 that holds them to a monetary standard rather than a 
benefit requirement, thereby rendering Medicaid a “premium support” 
program that gives private insurers control over access to both benefits 
and providers, without attendant accountability.57  In addition, for the 
first time, states can treat Medicaid enrollees within a category of 
eligibility differently.58  Although the states also sought to close off 
 
has an aggregate actuarial value that is at least actuarially equivalent to one 
of the benchmark benefit packages described in paragraph [b](1). 
(C) Substantial actuarial value for additional services included in benchmark 
package.  With respect to each of the following categories of additional 
services for which coverage is provided under the benchmark benefit 
package used under subparagraph (B), the coverage has an actuarial value 
that is equal to at least 75[%] of the actuarial value of the coverage of that 
category of services in such package: 
(i) Coverage of prescription drugs. 
(ii) Mental health services. 
(iii) Vision services. 
(iv) Hearing services. 
Id. § 1396u-7(b)(2)(B)-(C).  A qualified actuary must make the determination of 
actuarial equivalency, taking into account certain factors.  See id. § 1396u-7(b)(3). 
 55 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7. 
 56 See Sidney D. Watson, The View from the Bottom:  Consumer Directed Medicaid 
and Cost Shifting to Patients, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 403, 404 (2007). 
 57 Rosenbaum, supra note 14, at 41.  Professor Rosenbaum defines “premium 
support” as a monetary contribution toward paying for health coverage, which would 
reduce the Medicaid entitlement to a certain promised contribution rather than a 
defined set of benefits.  Id.   
 58 Id. at 33.  For example, Kentucky’s DRA program has four different plans and is 
one of the first states to implement the DRA Benchmark Provision.  See KyHealth 
Choices, Member Section, https://kentucky.fhsc.com/kmaa/sectionMains/ 
MembersMain.asp (click “benefit packages”) (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).  The four 
plans are dubbed Global Choices, Family Choices, Optimum Choices, and 
Comprehensive Choices.  Id.  Global Choices is the plan for most Medicaid enrollees 
(which the state calls “members”), and it covers what the state calls basic medical 
services, mental health services, and hearing and vision services for people under 18.  
Id.  Global Choices does not promise more than the Benchmark Coverage Equivalent 
requires.  Id.  Family Choices is the Kentucky Medicaid plan for most children, and it 
covers checkups and screenings, prescriptions, shots, doctor visits, eye exams and 
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court access to Medicaid enrollees, they were not successful 
incorporating this element into the DRA.59  At the time of this writing, 
eleven states had taken advantage of DRA flexibility.60 
The DRA Benchmark Provision, as discussed below, exacerbates a 
trend in the circuit courts that defines Medicaid as mere payments to 
the states rather than a system of medical care and services for 
enrollees.61  This provision alone could thwart enrollees’ and 
providers’ private enforcement actions against states,62 but the 
prospect is underlined by a double circuit court split pertaining to 
enforcement of conditions on federal spending by private parties 
through § 1983.  Combined, these developments make it so that some 
provisions of the Medicaid Act are now enforceable by § 1983 and 
some are not, depending on the statutory provision, the State plan, 
and the circuit’s interpretation of § 1983 jurisprudence. 
 
glasses, hearing services, dental care, hospital care, and mental health services.  Id.  
This closely follows EPSTD requirements.  42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(a)(4) (2006), 1396r 
(2006).  Optimum Choices covers enrollees who have mental retardation or 
developmental disabilities, and it articulates the goal of “keep[ing] a member out of an 
institution and in the community.”  KyHealth Choices, Member Section.  Though 
logistically separate, Optimum Choices has all the same benefits as Global Choices.  
Id.  The fourth part of Kentucky’s Medicaid DRA program is Comprehensive Choices, 
which covers enrollees in nursing homes and those who are ventilator-dependent or 
who have an acquired brain injury.  Id.  This part has the same benefits as Global 
Choices.  Id.  CMS explains in the draft regulations that it has interpreted Congress’s 
intent to give the states room to be creative as quite far-reaching.  See generally 73 
Fed. Reg. 9714, 9715 (Feb. 22, 2008) (asserting that Congress intended to provide 
States with “unprecedented flexibility”).  However, subsequent administrative 
interpretations have clarified that EPSDT benefits must still be provided, even in 
benchmark plans.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10), 1396d(a) (2006); see also JANE 
PERKINS, THE DRA BENEFIT PROVISIONS AND EPSDT, NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM 3-
4 (2006), http://www.healthlaw.org/library/attachment.81954. 
 59 See NAT’L GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, POLICY POSITION EC-16. MEDICAID REFORM § 16.2.5 
(2005), http://www.nga.org (follow “Policy Positions” hyperlink; then follow “EC-16. 
Medicaid Reform” hyperlink). 
 60 See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT (DRA) 
RELATED MEDICAID STATE PLAN AMENDMENTS (2008), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/ 
DeficitReductionAct/03_SPA.asp#TopOfPage. 
 61 See Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 910 (7th Cir. 2003).  As one of the 
first states to amend its state plan to create a Benchmark Program, Kentucky will be 
important to watch, as it also sits in the Sixth Circuit, which has adopted the limiting 
definition of “medical assistance.”  See Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 
539-41 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 62 See Rosenbaum, supra note 14, at 33-34 (noting that this is long-standing goal 
of National Governors’ Association). 
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II. THE TRIANGLE — § 1983, SPENDING, AND BENEFICIARIES 
That the federal government can place conditions on the receipt of 
funds by the states is well established.63  Indeed, the Spending Clause 
provides one of the broadest enumerated powers of Congress, though 
the clause has generated relatively little guidance from the Supreme 
Court.64  Generally the federal government enforces its own conditions 
on federal funds against the states.65  However, beneficiaries of federal 
funding, when not receiving the promised benefits, can enforce the 
undelivered conditions against states by suing state officers through § 
1983 claims pursuant to the holding in Maine v. Thiboutot.66 
 
 63 The idea that Congress can place conditions on spending to legislate behavior 
that may not otherwise be regulable dates back to Oklahoma v. Civil Service 
Commission, 330 U.S. 127, 137 (1947). 
 64 See David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst:  
A Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 
TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1198-99 (2004) (noting that expansive Spending Clause power was 
little touched by Rehnquist Court’s federalism revolution).  Though two decades old, 
Professor Rosenthal’s observations still ring true: 
The Supreme Court has seldom dealt directly with the validity of conditional 
federal spending, and its opinions in this area have not been especially 
helpful.  Although what is decided with respect to such spending could 
render irrelevant many generally accepted doctrines concerning the powers 
of and limitations upon the federal government, remarkably little scholarly 
attention has been paid to the problem as an aspect of constitutional law. 
Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 
1103, 1106 (1987).  Professor Rosenthal further noted that even when the Supreme 
Court engaged in a Spending Clause analysis and reiterated that the spending power is 
not unlimited, the Court never found limits on spending to actually exist.  Id. at 1110.  
But see generally Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box of Federalism:  The Case for 
Judicial Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461 (2002) 
(positing that conditions are more pernicious than outlawed commandeering and thus 
should not be placed on federal funds because they impose even greater burdens on 
state autonomy and because they distort horizontal competition between states and 
vertical competition between state and federal governments). 
 65 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981).  Justice 
Rehnquist wrote:  “In legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power, the typical 
remedy for state noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is not a private 
cause of action for noncompliance but rather action by the Federal Government to 
terminate funds to the state.”  Id.  The certitude of the statement is belied by the 
reality that the federal agencies in charge of enforcing conditions on spending are 
reluctant to enforce by withdrawing funds.  See Lisa E. Key, Private Enforcement of 
Federal Funding Conditions under Section 1983:  The Supreme Court’s Failure to Adhere 
to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29 UC DAVIS L. REV. 283, 292-93 (1996). 
 66 See 448 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1980) (holding that § 1983 provides causes of action for 
both constitutional and statutory violations and allowing award of attorney’s fees 
against state under § 1988 in state court action).  In Will v. Michigan Department of 
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Three converging trends will likely have a profound impact on 
§ 1983 litigation, especially as it relates to Medicaid.  First, a majority 
of Justices on the Roberts Court appear to believe that conditions on 
spending are not enforceable by beneficiaries of federal spending 
through § 1983 actions.67  Second, the circuits have been confused as 
to the application of the most recent § 1983 case, Gonzaga, and the 
Rehnquist majority’s dicta regarding private enforceability of 
conditions on federal spending.68  Third, some circuits are interpreting 
the foundational Medicaid statute and its “medical assistance” 
language to impose lesser conditions on the states than have been 
traditionally understood.69  Since the landmark decision in Thiboutot, 
the Court has chipped away at the precedent that has allowed private 
enforcement of federal laws in addition to constitutional rights.70  This 
movement will be important for both Spending Clause jurisprudence 
and for private enforcement of federal rights through § 1983. 
A. Private Enforcement of Federal Spending Laws and the Roberts Court 
The language of § 1983, a federal civil rights statute Congress 
enacted in 1871, provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress . . . .71 
 
State Police, the Court held that a state is not a “person” that can be held liable for 
damages under § 1983, narrowing the scope of Maine v. Thiboutot but not foreclosing 
equitable actions against state officers through § 1983 for violations of federal law.  
See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989) (noting that state 
officers qualified as “persons” under § 1983). 
 67 See infra Part III.A.2. 
 68 See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 279-80 (2002). 
 69 See infra Part III.B.2. 
 70 See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 1.  King v. Smith, in which the Court allowed private 
causes of action for welfare recipients, foreshadowed Thiboutot.  See King v. Smith, 
392 U.S. 309, 311-12 (1968).  It was not until Thiboutot, however, that the Court held 
specifically that § 1983 was available to enforce federal statutory rights in addition to 
constitutional protections.  Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 5-7. 
 71 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (emphasis added).  Congress passed § 1983 as part of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which was intended to protect freed slaves’ constitutional 
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This verbiage has facilitated private lawsuits to enforce federal statutes 
when their language does not provide a cause of action.72   
1. Spending Clause Legislation and § 1983 Enforcement Actions 
Maine v. Thiboutot and Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. 
Halderman created the foundation of modern § 1983 doctrine.73  
Although Thiboutot was the first case to explicitly articulate the rule 
allowing enforcement of federal statutory rights through § 1983 
(rather than constitutional rights),74 Pennhurst is the favored decision 
of the Court’s federalism-minded Justices, who appear interested in 
returning to its holding and analysis.75  The Justices’ reliance on 
Pennhurst is ominous, as Medicaid contains provisions that are quite 
similar to the federal statute at issue in that case.76 
 
rights in the “lawless and racist” South after the Civil War; later, the language of § 
1983 deliberately included the phrase “and laws” pursuant to a statutory amendment 
passed in 1874.  See Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983:  Doctrinal Foundations and an 
Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 483 n.6 (1982) (describing tension that 
exists in § 1983 interpretation and noting that it derives in part from Congress’s lack 
of guidance).  See generally Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with 
Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 86 (1989) (describing widely 
varying approaches to interpretation of § 1983 and proposing more openly political 
discourse surrounding its interpretation). 
 72 See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4. 
 73 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). 
 74 Other cases related to the Social Security Act implied that § 1983 was available 
for private causes of action, but none had set forth the rule expressed by Justice 
Brennan in Thiboutot.  See generally King, 392 U.S. at 311 (allowing private causes of 
action for welfare recipients). 
 75 In fact, stricter standards for conditions on spending, recently enunciated in 
Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy, were partially founded 
on Pennhurst.  See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 
296 (2006) (setting forth “clear notice” test that states’ rights justices had long 
desired).  On May 21, 2007, the Court announced a decision that was noted for its 
interpretation of the rights of parents to represent themselves and their children in 
IDEA cases.  See Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 
1994, 2004-05 (2007).  That decision also contained an affirmation of Arlington’s clear 
notice standard.  See id. at 2006.  For a discussion of the line of dissents that became 
the majority in Arlington, see Nicole Huberfeld, Clear Notice for Conditions on 
Spending, Unclear Implications for States in Federal Healthcare Programs, 86 N.C. L. 
REV. 441, 453-56 (2008).  Arlington is likely to narrow Congress’s ability to place 
conditions on federal funds, and the Court in Winkelman confirmed that 
interpretation of Arlington.  Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2006.  Arlington and Winkelman 
can be seen as part of a larger trend in the Roberts Court — a willingness to revisit 
Spending Clause doctrine.  See Arlington, 548 U.S. at 297. 
 76 See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 5-6 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6000 et seq. (1976)). 
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The 1980 holding in Thiboutot permitted citizens to bring actions 
against states for violations of all federal laws.77  Justice Brennan 
determined that the historical modifications that resulted in the 
language “and laws” in the recodification effort of 1874 were 
deliberate and that the provision was expanded, intentionally, to 
provide remedies for violations of the laws of the United States in 
addition to violations of the United States Constitution.78  In other 
words, Justice Brennan read the phrase “and laws” to provide a 
statutory cause of action that was not limited to just those actions 
traditionally considered civil rights actions.79  Justice Brennan’s 
interpretation also avoided applying Cort v. Ash, which set forth a 
limiting test for finding implied causes of action in federal statutes.80  
Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Powell’s dissent, which found that the 
history of § 1983’s recodification dictated the opposite result from 
Justice Brennan’s conclusion.  Justice Powell was also deeply skeptical 
about the “dramatic[]” expansion of litigation that could result from 
the Court’s decision.81 
Almost as soon as the Court read § 1983 to apply to all federal laws, 
then-Associate Justice Rehnquist began to narrow that construal in the 
holding and analysis of Pennhurst.  Pennhurst marked the beginning of 
a line of Supreme Court cases that declined to find a substantive right 
enforceable through § 1983.82  Thus, Pennhurst often is cited as 
support for the intertwined ideas that the federal government alone 
enforces conditions on spending through withdrawal of funds and that 
the ability to use § 1983 to privately enforce conditions on spending is 
limited, if not non-existent.83  Justice Rehnquist noted that the “typical 
remedy” for state noncompliance with conditions on spending 
 
 77 See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4. 
 78 Id. at 7.  The plaintiffs sued Maine for violations of the Social Security Act, 
specifically the welfare provisions that would have permitted the family to receive 
credit for child-support payments.  See id. at 2-3.  At the time, welfare was a 
cooperative federal-state program, much like Medicaid.  See 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1991) 
(amended 1996). 
 79 See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4. 
 80 See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). 
 81 See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 12 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 82 See generally Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) 
(holding that statutory bill of rights could not confer privately enforceable rights for 
purposes of § 1983 claims).  As the Court noted in Gonzaga:  “Since Pennhurst, only 
twice have we found spending legislation to give rise to enforceable rights.  In Wright 
v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority …[and] in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital 
Association.”  Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280 (2002). 
 83 See id. at 28.  Pennhurst is also the progenitor of the requirement for “clear 
notice” for placing conditions on spending.  See Huberfeld, supra note 75, at 455. 
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potentially conflicted with the holding in Thiboutot allowing private 
causes of action against the offending state.84  However, because the 
Court found that the Bill of Rights section of the Developmentally 
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act was merely precatory and 
conferred no substantive rights on the plaintiffs, the Court did not 
analyze further whether beneficiaries of federal spending can use § 
1983 to privately enforce conditions on spending.85  In other words, 
the majority avoided interpretation of Thiboutot because it construed 
the Bill of Rights as hortatory rather than mandatory.86  The Court in 
Pennhurst also endorsed what has become a favorite theme for judges 
who would limit the power to spend in general:  the contract 
analogy.87  As will be discussed below, federal courts cite the Pennhurst 
contract analogy to support limitations on § 1983 causes of action and 
to limit remedies for beneficiaries of federal spending in general.  In 
addition, an increasing number of federal judges cite Pennhurst to 
support their decisions that Medicaid provisions are not privately 
enforceable.88   
Nine years after Pennhurst, the Court detoured briefly (yet 
importantly) from the course of narrowing Thiboutot by allowing 
healthcare providers who participated in Medicaid to challenge 
Virginia’s reimbursement rates in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass’n.89  The 
majority allowed an association of hospitals to enforce the Boren 
Amendment requirement for reasonable and adequate payment rates 
through a § 1983 action because the provision specifically required 
states to pay reasonable rates.90  The Court read the Boren Amendment 
 
 84 See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 28.  Lower federal courts, in limiting or explaining 
the extent to which § 1983 actions are available to enforce federal statutes, often cite 
this dicta.  See Ball v. Rodgers, 492 F.3d 1094, 1104 (9th Cir. 2007); Sabree ex rel. 
Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 183 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 85 Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 28 n.21. 
 86 Justice White’s dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, would have 
found that the Bill of Rights was mandatory and thus enforceable through § 1983.  See 
id. at 39-53 (White, J., dissenting). 
 87 See id. at 17. 
 88 See Doe v. Kidd, 501 F.3d 348, 366 (4th Cir. 2007); Ball, 492 F.3d at 1104; 
Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 89 Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990).  Wilder was influenced by two 
intervening § 1983 decisions.  Id. at 512.  Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and 
Housing Authority allowed tenants to enforce rent-ceilings created in the Brooke 
Amendment to the Fair Housing Act by § 1983.  See 479 U.S. 418, 439 (1987).  The 
second was the § 1983-limiting holding in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los 
Angeles.  493 U.S. 103 (1989).   
 90 See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509-20; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1980) 
(consisting of now-repealed element of Medicaid Act that permitted healthcare 
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to be mandatory, not precatory, which conferred a substantive and 
specific federal right on Medicaid-participating healthcare providers that 
was enforceable under § 1983.91  Justice Brennan echoed Justice 
Rehnquist’s analysis in Pennhurst but found that, consistent with Justice 
Rehnquist’s call for more than congressional expressions of preference, 
Congress had created a definite right for healthcare providers by 
requiring states to adopt reasonable and adequate rates for hospitals.92  
Justice Brennan opened the door to enforcement claims by both 
providers and Medicaid enrollees, arguably ensuring that the Medicaid 
program was not excluded from § 1983 enforcement actions.93   
The Wilder dissent, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined 
by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, described Thiboutot as 
eliminating implied cause of action standards, disapproving of the 
decision while buttressing Justice Rehnquist’s narrow statutory 
interpretation in Pennhurst (which had precluded a § 1983 cause of 
action).94  The dissent read Pennhurst to prevent a § 1983 cause of 
action because Congress did not intend the Boren Amendment to create 
an enforceable right.95  The dissent’s analysis parallels the amicus brief 
on behalf of the United States as written by then-Deputy Solicitor 
General John G. Roberts.  That amicus brief not only read the Boren 
Amendment narrowly in concluding that it conferred no enforceable 
rights but also opined that individual interests that arise as a result of 
federal spending may not be enforceable as rights under § 1983.96   
In 1997, the Court appeared to settle the scope of plaintiffs’ ability 
to privately enforce federal laws using § 1983.97  Justice O’Connor’s 
majority opinion in Blessing v. Freestone articulated a three-part test to 
determine when § 1983 actions are permitted to enforce federal laws98:  
First, the opinion instructed that Congress must intend that the 
provision benefit the plaintiff.  “Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the right . . . protected by the statute is not so ‘vague and 
amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain judicial competence.  
 
providers to contest payment rates states set for their Medicaid reimbursement). 
 91 See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 512. 
 92 See id. 
 93 The petitioners argued that the Medicaid Act precluded private causes of action, 
even though no private cause of action exists in the Medicaid statutory or regulatory 
provisions and Congress had not directly addressed the issue.  See id. at 520-21. 
 94 See id. at 525-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 95 See id. at 525. 
 96 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11, 
Wilder, 496 U.S. 498 (No. 88-2043) (relying on Pennhurst). 
 97 See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997). 
 98 See id. 
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Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on 
the States,” meaning it “must be couched in mandatory . . . terms.”99  
Justice O’Connor’s analysis relied in part on Wilder and Pennhurst; 
ultimately the aggregate nature of the welfare provision at issue 
defeated the plaintiffs’ claims because no individual right existed in 
the statutory language.100  The Court, however, preserved plaintiffs’ 
ability to bring § 1983 claims to enforce federal statutes, including 
other aspects of the welfare statute, which were connected to Medicaid 
through statutory structure and benefits. 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Kennedy, agreed with the Blessing 
majority that no private cause of action existed given the generalized 
relief sought, but his concurrence openly questioned the use of § 1983 
to authorize beneficiaries of federal-state Spending Clause legislation to 
bring suit.101  Justice Scalia relied on the Pennhurst contract analogy102 
and compared enrollees in welfare programs to third-party beneficiaries 
of contracts.103  According to the concurrence, the relationship between 
 
 99 Id. (internal citations omitted).  The Court denied mothers the right to enforce 
child support provisions within the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
statutory scheme against Arizona because the newly articulated three-part test, which 
drew upon Wilder, was not met.  See id. at 345-46. 
 100 See id. at 341-48. 
 101 See id. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia wrote: 
I agree with the Court that under the test set forth in Wright v. Roanoke 
Redevelopment and Housing Authority and Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 does not permit individual beneficiaries of Title IV-D of the 
Social Security Act to bring suit challenging a State’s failure to achieve 
“substantial compliance” with the requirements of Title IV-D.  That 
conclusion makes it unnecessary to reach the question whether § 1983 ever 
authorizes the beneficiaries of a federal-state funding and spending agreement — 
such as Title IV-D — to bring suit.   
See id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
 102 The Pennhurst Court stated: 
[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature 
of a contract; in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with 
federally imposed conditions.  The legitimacy of Congress’[s] power to 
legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State 
voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the “contract” . . . . 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
 103 See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia wrote: 
Until relatively recent times, the third-party beneficiary was generally 
regarded as a stranger to the contract, and could not sue upon it; . . . the 
only person who could enforce the promise in court was the other party to 
the contract . . . .  This appears to have been the law at the time § 1983 was 
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the federal government and the state did not provide an opportunity to 
privately enforce breaches of the conditions the federal government 
placed on the state because, at the time Congress passed § 1983 in 1871, 
third-party beneficiaries to contracts had no ability to enforce or 
challenge the contract that benefited them.104  Thus, Justices Scalia and 
Kennedy would have narrowed significantly private parties’ ability to 
bring § 1983 actions, stating that “the ability of persons in respondents’ 
situation to compel a State to make good on its promise to the Federal 
Government was not a ‘righ[t] . . . secured by the . . . laws’ under § 
1983.”105  Acknowledging that the Court had thus far permitted 
beneficiaries’ private causes of action, Justice Scalia welcomed future 
cases that challenged, in essence, any beneficiary suing to enforce 
conditions on federal spending.106 
Given the Scalia-Kennedy concurrence in Blessing, and the Court’s 
ongoing narrowing of the § 1983 cause of action, the 2002 decision in 
Gonzaga University v. Doe could have been more drastic.107  Chief 
 
enacted. . . . 
. . . I am not prepared without further consideration to reject the possibility 
that third-party-beneficiary suits simply do not lie. 
Id. at 349-50 (citation omitted).  Justices Scalia and Kennedy appear to have found 
persuasive the amicus brief of the Council of State Governments, National Governors’ 
Association, and other related parties, as the concurrence echoes many of the brief’s 
points regarding whether federal spending statutes should be enforceable against 
states by private parties.  See Brief for the Council of State Governments, National 
Governors’ Ass’n, National Conference of State Legislatures, National Ass’n of 
Counties, International City/County Management Ass’n, and International Municipal 
Lawyers Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8-15, Blessing, 520 U.S. 329 
(No. 95-1441), 1996 WL 422135.  The amicus brief drew on the dissents in Wilder 
and the Pennhurst majority as support for the proposition that no private cause of 
action should exist.  Id. at 13-14. 
 104 See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 349-50 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia’s point 
may not be as unassailable as asserted in the concurrence.  For example, as early as 
1859, New York courts applied trust principles to facilitate a suit by a third-party 
beneficiary against the party breaching a contract.  See Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 
274-75 (1859); see also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 653-57 (4th ed. 2004) 
(describing historical development of third-party beneficiary doctrine).  The briefs in 
Gonzaga also bring this point to the fore, as John G. Roberts, then in private practice, 
represented the university and articulated the same arguments that Justices Scalia and 
Kennedy advanced in Blessing.  See Brief for Petitioners at 39-43, Gonzaga Univ. v. 
Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (No. 01-679); see also Brief for Respondent at 46-49, 
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. 273 (No. 01-679) (analyzing third-party beneficiary analogy and 
describing why it is invalid method of interpreting § 1983 causes of action). 
 105 Blessing, 520 U.S. at 350 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 106 See id. 
 107 See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 273.  The Court held that a student could not sue 
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Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion that narrowed, and 
attempted to clarify, the Blessing test but did not absolutely reject 
private enforcement of conditions on spending.  However, the 
majority expressed deep skepticism regarding private parties enforcing 
federal conditions on spending against states.  Citing Pennhurst, the 
Court wrote:  “unless Congress ‘speak[s] with a clear voice’ and 
manifests an ‘unambiguous’ intent to confer individual rights, federal 
funding provisions provide no basis for private enforcement by § 
1983.”108  The majority reiterated the observation from Blessing that 
only twice since Thiboutot had the Court found that Spending Clause 
legislation could give rise to privately enforceable rights.109  
Emphasizing that more recent cases had rejected private causes of 
action, the majority announced that § 1983 only provides a remedy for 
deprivations of rights as conferred by a federal statute, not mere 
benefits or interests — effectively limiting the nexus between § 1983 
and Spending Clause legislation.110  Ultimately, the Court constructed 
a new test that appears to replace part one of the Blessing test (though 
the Court was not clear on the use or breadth of its clarifying 
language).  The test asks whether the statute in question confers 
individual rights with the kind of language that is found in, by 
example, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 — “no person . . .  
shall . . . be subjected to . . . .”111  In other words, Congress must 
create new rights that are to be enforced by § 1983 in “clear and 
unambiguous terms.”112   
The concurrence and the dissent in Gonzaga expressed varying 
degrees of skepticism regarding the Court’s narrowed view of the § 
1983 cause of action.  Justice Breyer’s concurrence disagreed with the 
slender window of opportunity delineated by the majority and noted 
that the majority would only find a right that allows a private party to 
 
using § 1983 for a privacy breach under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy 
Act (“FERPA”), a federal spending statute that ties funds for education to privacy of 
student records.  See id. at 276. 
 108 Id. at 280 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 28 
n.21 (1981)). 
 109 See id. (citing Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990); Wright v. City of 
Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987)). 
 110 See id. at 283 (citing Blessing as example of narrowing of § 1983 causes of 
action since Thiboutot). 
 111 Id. at 284.  The Title VI example is strange given that the Court rejected private 
enforcement of § 602 of that provision by implied cause of action in Alexander v. Sandoval 
just a year before Gonzaga.  See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287-89 (2001). 
 112 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 290. 
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sue “if set forth ‘unambiguously’ in the statute’s ‘text and structure.’”113  
Justice Stevens’s dissent noted that that majority conflated causes of 
action under § 1983 and implied causes of action generally (as 
delineated by Cort v. Ash), thus imposing a more stringent test on 
plaintiffs seeking to vindicate rights under § 1983 and a greater 
burden on Congress to include rights-creating language in federal 
laws.114  Justice Stevens also noted that it is virtually impossible to 
reconcile Gonzaga with Wilder and Wright v. City of Roanoke 
Redevelopment & Housing Authority, accusing the majority of silently 
overruling the two precedents.115   
Three days before the decision in Gonzaga, the Court issued an 
opinion in another Spending Clause case, Barnes v. Gorman.116  
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia reiterated the analysis 
articulated in his Blessing concurrence and, relying on Pennhurst’s 
contract analogy, determined that because punitive damages are not 
available for breach of contract, they are not available for violations of 
federal conditions on spending.117  More specifically, the Court held 
that the contract analogy does not allow for punitive damages because 
the funding recipient must be “on notice that, by accepting federal 
funding, it exposes itself to liability of that nature.”118  The majority 
concluded that states would not accept federal funding if they knew at 
the time they accepted the funding that punitive damages would be 
available for violations of the conditions on spending.119  The majority 
also emphasized that the federal government and/or the funding 
 
 113 Id. at 291 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Justices Breyer and Souter agreed with the 
majority, however, that the precise language of FERPA does not confer an individual cause 
of action.  See id. at 291-92. 
 114 See id. at 300-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting).   
 115 Id. at 300 n.8; see supra note 89. 
 116 See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185-86 (2002).  The plaintiff in this case 
(respondent) was a paraplegic who was injured when he was transported in a police 
van that was not equipped to transport people with such disabilities.  Id. at 183-84.  
He successfully sued the local police under the Americans with Disabilities Act and 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the jury awarded compensatory and 
punitive damages.  See id.  The issue confronting the Court was whether punitive 
damages could be awarded to a private plaintiff under the ADA or section 504, both of 
which contain Spending Clause elements.  See id. at 185-86. 
 117 See id. at 187. 
 118 Id.  The majority relied on the dissenting language in a series of Title IX cases 
beginning with Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Davis v. Monroe County Board of 
Education, 526 U.S. 629, 654 (1999).  Justice Kennedy’s dissent became the majority 
view in Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 
304 (2006). 
 119 See Barnes, 536 U.S. at 188. 
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recipient are made whole when the state’s contractual obligation is 
fulfilled.120  Thus, the 2001-2002 term produced two cases that 
continued the movement toward limited remedies for private parties 
injured by states’ failure to meet conditions placed on federal funds.  
These two cases were part of the Rehnquist Court’s quest for clear 
statement rules in federal legislation.121   
Gonzaga allowed Thiboutot to remain good, albeit hobbled, 
precedent.  On the other hand, Arlington Central School District Board 
of Education v. Murphy, a first-term Roberts Court case, furthered the 
Rehnquist Court’s goal of reining in individuals’ ability to enforce 
conditions on spending against the states.  In Arlington, Justice Alito 
articulated a narrowed standard for conditions on spending by 
requiring Congress to give the states “clear notice” of all conditions on 
spending before they accept federal funds.122  Arlington seems to 
render the Gonzaga modification of the Blessing test even narrower, 
refusing any inference that § 1983 would allow private causes of 
action without explicit statutory language.123   
 
 120 See id. at 188-89. 
 121 See Thomas M. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism after Raich:  The Case for Clear 
Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 823, 825 (2005).  Professor Merrill set forth 
examples of the Rehnquist Court’s search for clear statement rules: 
Thus, in cases involving the States’ immunity from lawsuits under the [11th] 
Amendment, the Court held that such suits were permitted only if 
authorized by Congress in “clear and unmistakable” language in the statute.  
The Court similarly held that conditions attached to grants of federal monies 
could be enforced against the States only if set forth “unambiguously” in the 
grant.  And in Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Court said it would interpret a federal 
regulatory statute to apply to traditional state functions, such as the 
appointment of state judges, only if there was a “plain statement” from 
Congress requiring this result.   
Id. (citations omitted). 
 122 See Arlington, 548 U.S. at 296; see also Denise C. Morgan & Rebecca E. Zeitlow, 
The New Parity Debate:  Congress and Rights of Belonging, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1347, 
1364-66 (2005) (enumerating ways in which Rehnquist federalism revolution 
narrowed avenues of enforcing individual rights and noting then-unexecuted interest 
of conservative justices in containing individuals’ ability to enforce conditions on 
spending and Spending Clause power in general). 
 123 A 2003 preemption case, Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. 
Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003), also provided a platform for Justices Scalia and Thomas 
to articulate skepticism regarding private causes of action to enforce conditions on 
spending.  See id. at 675 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 682-83 (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  Justice Thomas noted his doubt that beneficiaries of cooperative 
federalism programs can sue to enforce their benefits, stating:  “[W]ere the issue to be 
raised, I would give careful consideration to whether Spending Clause legislation can 
be enforced by third parties in the absence of a private right of action.”  Id. at 683. 
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Despite Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy’s leeriness to allow 
private enforcement of conditions on spending by § 1983 claims,124 
legislation created under the Spending Clause is still the law of the 
land.  The contract analogy cannot be more than that — an analogy, 
perhaps a model for analysis, but not the law.  Otherwise, conditions 
placed on state acceptance of federal funds pursuant to the Spending 
Clause would have less influence than other federal laws, and states 
could take federal money with less fear of enforcement or penalty.125  
Surely the Court does not intend to indicate that spending legislation 
is not underpinned by the Supremacy Clause.126  Furthermore, third-
party beneficiaries in the modern era can enforce contractual 
provisions intended to benefit them.127  States participate in Medicaid 
to benefit their poorest, neediest citizens, and they cannot be surprised 
that enrollees are the intended beneficiaries of the partnership 
between the federal and state governments. 
 
 124 For a more extreme position on this issue, see David E. Engdahl, The Spending 
Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 49-53 (1994), which argues that the “Taxing Clause” does not 
authorize federal spending and that instead the Article IV property clause authorizes 
limited spending powers for Congress.  Professor Engdahl also asserted that the 
decision in Thiboutot “simply is nonsense” because beneficiaries of federal spending 
directed at states should never have had the right to sue to collect on the conditioned 
spending, and he predicted that the possibility of the opinion’s “survival in the face of 
candid reassessment is very poor.”  Id. at 108.  Fundamental elements of the Thiboutot 
doctrine have survived, but it certainly is a weakened precedent after nearly three 
decades of chipping away. 
 125 See Edward A. Tomlinson & Jerry L. Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal 
Standards in Grant-in-Aid Programs:  Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. 
REV. 600, 619-20 (1972) (explaining that federal agencies tend not to enforce 
spending programs they oversee against states — instead, they attempt to coax 
cooperation — and why beneficiary involvement would be helpful); see also Jane 
Perkins, Medicaid:  Past Successes and Future Challenges, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 7, 32-33 
(2002) (noting that DHHS can withdraw all funding from state if it fails to comply 
with its approved State Plan, but that this remedy has not been applied because it is 
too draconian). 
 126 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  Medicaid enrollees have had some minor success 
with a Supremacy Clause argument that a state can “violate” the Supremacy Clause by 
providing benefits that are so minimal as to “conflict” with the federal scheme, even 
though Medicaid is a cooperative federalism program and not usually subject to 
preemption analysis.  See generally Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496 (8th Cir. 
2006) (allowing claim that Missouri failed to comply with certain Medicaid Act 
requirements and thus had violated Supremacy Clause to survive summary judgment). 
 127 See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 104, § 10.3 (describing modern rule 
for contract beneficiaries); see also Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 272-75 (1859). 
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2. Trends 
The thread of Spending Clause enforcement via § 1983 Supreme 
Court cases reveals at least three ongoing and important developments.  
First, the contract analogy for Spending Clause legislation that imposes 
conditions on states’ use of federal funds remains in vogue.  The Court 
first articulated the idea of conditions on spending as an agreement 
between the state and the federal government in Steward Machine Co. v. 
Davis, but the more severe contract analogy was made popular by 
Associate Justice Rehnquist in Pennhurst.128  Pennhurst is the key citation 
for federal judges who believe that conditions on federal spending 
should be curbed to protect states.129  One of the more notable 
examples, Sabree v. Houston, relied on Pennhurst for the proposition that 
spending legislation rarely confers individual causes of action through § 
1983.130  The district court’s rejection of all causes of action related to 
enforcing Medicaid provisions131 was reversed by the Third Circuit 
 
 128 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981); see 
also Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 593-98 (1937) (describing 
and approving of conditions on federal spending as being in nature of agreement 
between state and federal government to undertake common goal).  The majority in 
Steward Machine was careful to describe conditions on federal spending as statutory 
requirements that created an agreement with the states, and it did not wholly endorse 
or reject the idea of the contract analogy; in other words, Justice Rehnquist stretched 
the language of Steward Machine’s majority in Pennhurst.  See Steward, 301 U.S. at 597-
98.  Justice Cardozo wrote: 
The inference of abdication thus dissolves in thinnest air when the deposit is 
conceived of as dependent upon a statutory consent, and not upon a 
contract effective to create a duty.  By this we do not intimate that the 
conclusion would be different if a contract were discovered . . . .  The states 
are at liberty, upon obtaining the consent of Congress, to make agreements 
with one another.  We find no room for doubt that they may do the like with 
Congress if the essence of their statehood is maintained without impairment 
. . . .  Nowhere in our scheme of government — in the limitations express or 
implied of our federal constitution — do we find that she is prohibited from 
assenting to conditions that will assure a fair and just requital for benefits 
received. 
Id. at 597-98 (citations omitted).  Steward is also an important case for rejecting the 
Tenth Amendment argument against allowing conditions on federal spending, an idea 
that seems to lurk behind the most recent Spending Clause decisions.  Id. at 595-96. 
 129 See, e.g., Doe v. Kidd, 501 F.3d 348, 366 (4th Cir. 2007); Ball v. Rodgers, 492 
F.3d 1094, 1104 (9th Cir. 2007); Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
 130 See Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Houston, 245 F. Supp. 2d 653, 657-58 (E.D. Pa., 
2003), rev’d, 367 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 131 See id.  Judge Hutton wrote:  “[S]ection 1396 of Title XIX does not have the 
rights-creating language integral to a showing of [c]ongressional intent to confer 
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Court of Appeals, but then-Judge Alito revealed in a concurrence that 
he believed the district court articulated the direction of “future 
Supreme Court cases.”132  The future described by the district court 
expressed skepticism that spending legislation can “confer individual 
rights.”133  At first blush, Judge Alito’s concurrence would indicate a 
change of heart from Pennsylvania Pharmacists Ass’n v. Houstoun in 
which he had written that the new version of the Boren Amendment 
was not enforceable by pharmacists against the Secretary of the 
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare but then hinted that 
Medicaid enrollees might be able to assert § 1983 claims.134  However, 
Judge Alito’s majority opinion in Houstoun is not so different from his 
Sabree concurrence, because in choosing to diverge from the trend in 
other circuits, the Houstoun opinion radically narrowed the ability of 
Medicaid healthcare providers to enforce standards regarding 
reimbursement for their services.135 
Dissenting justices have expressed apprehension over the contract 
analogy numerous times.  Justice Souter’s and Justice Stevens’s 
concurrences in Barnes v. Gorman underscored the increasing rigidity 
with which the Court has applied the analogy.136  Justice Souter, 
joined by Justice O’Connor, pointed out that the contract analogy 
would not be a proper model in all cases of private claims under 
Spending Clause legislation.137  Justice Stevens highlighted the Court’s 
interest in expanding the contract-analogy reasoning from Pennhurst, 
which has been a clear trend.138  The analogy taken literally also closes 
the courthouse doors, which was attempted in the Medicaid context in 
 
rights.”  Id. at 659. 
 132 Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 194 (3d Cir. 2004) (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
 133 See Sabree, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 657. 
 134 See Pa. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 541-42 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(holding that healthcare providers could not enforce Medicaid’s sufficient payment 
provision).  This Medicaid provision is the somewhat weaker follow-up to the 
repealed Boren Amendment.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (1994) (repealed 1997) 
(concerning adequate payment for providers).   
 135 Justice Alito appears to have drawn on the Wilder dissent’s insistence on narrow 
statutory interpretation in § 1983 causes of action.  See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 
U.S. 498, 526 (1990). 
 136 See 536 U.S. 181, 190-91 (2002) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 137 See id. (“I . . . read the Court’s opinion as acknowledging, that the contract-law 
analogy may fail to give such helpfully clear answers to other questions that may be 
raised by actions for private recovery under Spending Clause legislation . . . .”). 
 138 See id. at 193 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring) (pointing out dangers of contract 
analogy and denouncing district court’s decision in Westside Mothers v. Haveman). 
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the infamous district court decision in Westside Mothers v. Haveman.139 
A second notable trend is that changes in the composition of the 
Court during the Roberts era have enhanced support for the contract 
analogy and the corollary argument against private enforcement 
claims.  Justice Alito, while serving on the Third Circuit, narrowed 
Medicaid healthcare providers’ ability to enforce reimbursement 
provisions through § 1983 and endorsed a district court decision that 
would have denied entirely private causes of action to enforce 
Medicaid statutory provisions.140  Also, though representing clients in 
private practice is not a perfect predictor, when Chief Justice Roberts 
represented Gonzaga University before the Supreme Court, he 
advanced the idea that § 1983 cannot apply to Spending Clause 
legislation due to the third-party beneficiary theory.141  John Roberts 
had also taken this position as Deputy Solicitor General submitting an 
amicus brief in Wilder.142  Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts thus 
appear to agree with the Scalia and Kennedy Blessing concurrence, 
which invited cases that would allow a direct attack on private 
enforcement of spending legislation.143  Justice Thomas has likewise 
rejected private causes of action to enforce spending clause 
legislation.144  Justice O’Connor’s departure is also important for this 
 
 139 See Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 575-82 (2001); see also 
Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 538-39 (describing trend toward limiting civil rights 
actions in Rehnquist Court years); Erwin Chemerinsky, Ensuring the Supremacy of 
Federal Law:  Why the District Court Was Wrong in Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 12 
HEALTH MATRIX 139, 147 (2002) (decrying district court’s decision for taking contract 
analogy too literally, to nonsensical result) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Ensuring]. 
 140 See Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 194 (3d Cir. 2004) (Alito, 
J., concurring). 
 141 See Brief of Petitioners at 39-43, Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) 
(No. 01-679).   
 142 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11, 
Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990) (No. 88-2043). 
 143 See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 350 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
Justice Scalia wrote:   
It must be acknowledged that Wright and Wilder permitted beneficiaries of 
federal-state contracts to sue under § 1983, but the [contract] argument set 
forth above was not raised.  I am not prepared without further consideration to 
reject the possibility that third-party-beneficiary suits simply do not lie.  I join 
the Court’s opinion because, in ruling against respondents under the 
Wright/Wilder test, it leaves that possibility open. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 144 See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 683 (2003) 
(Thomas, J. concurring); see also supra note 123. 
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calculus, as she did not vote consistently with the other states’-rights 
Justices against private parties.145 
The third trend is that it appears an “intentionalist” reading 
currently dominates § 1983 jurisprudence, though the jurists who 
apply the narrow reading of § 1983’s reach tend to claim a “textualist” 
approach.146  In other words, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas 
have championed the theory that the Congress that drafted § 1983 in 
1871 would not have intended § 1983 to extend to the citizens 
benefited by federal spending programs or cooperative federalism 
programs (such as Medicaid).  This idea is at least questionable, given 
that § 1983’s plain words specifically protect something more than 
constitutional rights; the statute provides a claim for relief for 
violations of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws . . . .”147  The language “and laws” includes 
statutory rights in § 1983’s protections; and, if the language of the 
statute is clear, legislative history need not be consulted.148  Justice 
 
 145 See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (voting with 
individual-rights four to allow retaliation claim to move forward under Title IX).  In 
Jackson, a male physical education teacher and coach complained of sex 
discrimination in the school’s athletics program and was fired from his coaching job 
for repeated complaints of unequal funding and access for his girls’ basketball team.  
Id. at 171-72.  Justice O’Connor’s majority read Title IX broadly to allow the 
retaliation claim, even though the coach had not experienced sex discrimination 
directly.  Id. at 174.  As Professor Baker has noted, Justice O’Connor read the statute 
as a civil rights-type statute and was inclined to interpret it broadly.  See Lynn A. 
Baker, Lochner’s Legacy for Modern Federalism:  Pierce County v. Guillen as a Case 
Study, 85 B.U. L. REV. 727, 760-61 (2005). 
 146 See Philip P. Frickey, Transcending the Routine:  Methodology and Constitutional 
Values in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Statutory Cases, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 266-68 
(Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006).  Professor Frickey briefly describes three approaches to 
legislative interpretation:  textualist, which denotes an inclination to read only the 
words of the statute; intentionalist, which signifies an interest in legislative history 
and congressional intent; and purposivist, which allows a judge to read statutes 
flexibly, as living documents, to fulfill “reasonable policy outcomes.”  Id.; see also 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 219-45 (2d ed. 2006) (describing and critiquing three 
theories and their postulates). 
 147 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 148 See, e.g., Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 
1, 6 (2000).  Authoring the majority, Justice Scalia wrote:   
[W]e begin with the understanding that Congress “says in a statute what it 
means and means in a statute what it says there.” . . . [W]hen “the statute’s 
language is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts’” — at least where the 
disposition required by the text is not absurd — “‘is to enforce it according 
to its terms.’” 
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Scalia has asserted that “legislative intent is an oxymoron,”149 yet his 
approach to § 1983 is not textualist, and limits plaintiffs’ access to the 
court system.150 
B. Beyond Gonzaga — The Double Circuit Split 
Despite Chief Justice Rehnquist’s goal of clarifying § 1983 causes of 
action to enforce federal statutes,151 Gonzaga’s legacy is a hodgepodge 
of lower court decisions.  Some courts have substituted Gonzaga for 
the first element of the Blessing test,152 some courts primarily have 
substituted Gonzaga for, or conflate, Gonzaga and Blessing,153 and 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  Before Justice Scalia joined the Court, Justice 
Rehnquist had begun to seek a “constrained approach” to statutory interpretation, a 
legacy of the Rehnquist Court.  See Frickey, supra note 146, at 267-68.  Professor 
Frickey describes Justice Scalia’s approach as “text based.”  See id. at 268-69.  For a 
brief list of the major scholarship on Justice Scalia’s textualist approach to legislation, 
see ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 146, at 230 n.33. 
 149 Frickey, supra note 146, at 271 (adding that Justice Thomas tends to agree with 
Justice Scalia’s “absolute exclusionary rule” regarding legislative findings). 
 150 See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text. 
 151 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that Blessing might have created “confusion” and 
“uncertainty.”  Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282-83 (2002).  The majority 
acknowledged that its opinions in the § 1983 arena had created confusion in the lower 
courts and were not “models of clarity,” which inspired the Court to grant certiorari 
to “resolve any ambiguity.”  Id. at 278. 
 152 See, e.g., Ball v. Rodgers, 492 F.3d 1094, 1104-06 (9th Cir. 2007); Mandy R. v. 
Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 1146-48 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom. Mandy R. v. 
Ritter, 127 S. Ct. 1905 (2007); Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 542 (6th 
Cir. 2006); Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 508-09 (8th Cir. 2006); Harris v. 
Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 461, 463 (6th Cir. 2006); Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 
1160 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom. Goldberg v. Watson, 127 S. Ct. 598 (2006); 
Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005); S.D. ex rel. Dickson v. 
Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 602-04 (5th Cir. 2004); Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 
F.3d 180, 184 (3rd Cir. 2004); Equal Access for El Paso v. Hawkins, 428 F. Supp. 2d 
585, 610-13 (W.D. Tex. 2006), rev’d, 509 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2007); Nelson v. 
Milwaukee County, No. 04 C 0193, 2006 WL 290510 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 7, 2006); Nat’l 
Med. Care, Inc. v. Rullan, No. Civ. 04-1812(HL), 2005 WL 2878094 (D.P.R. Nov. 1, 
2005), motion to certify appeal granted by No. Civ. 04-1812(HL), 2006 WL 130766 
(D.P.R. Jan. 13, 2006); Mundell v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Saguache County, No. 
Civ.A05CV00585REBMJW, 2005 WL 2124842 (D. Colo. Sept. 2, 2005); Reynolds v. 
Giuliani, No. 98 Civ.8877(WHP), 2005 WL 342106 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2005); 
Michelle P. ex rel. Deisenroth v. Holsinger, 356 F. Supp. 2d 763 (E.D. Ky. 2005); 
Health Care for All, Inc. v. Romney, No. Civ.A.00-10833-RWZ, 2004 WL 3088654 (D. 
Mass. Oct. 1, 2004); Memisovski ex rel. Memisovski v. Maram, No. 92 C 1982, 2004 
WL 1878332 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2004); Masterman v. Goodno, No. Civ.03-
2939(JRT/FLN), 2004 WL 51271 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2004); Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. 
Perdue, 218 F.R.D. 277 (N.D. Ga. 2003). 
 153 See, e.g., Hawkins, 509 F.3d at 704; Bertrand ex rel. Bertrand v. Maram, 495 F.3d 
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some courts effectively ignore Gonzaga.154  In the context of Medicaid 
enforcement claims, the Gonzaga circuit split is further complicated by 
 
452, 456-57 (7th Cir. 2007); Rio Grande Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc. v. Rullan, 397 F.3d 
56, 73 n.10 (1st Cir. 2005) (applying Gonzaga analysis but Blessing requirements were 
also met); Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190, 201-02 (2d Cir. 2004); Long Term 
Care Pharmacy Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2004); Bruggeman ex 
rel. Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 911 (7th Cir. 2003); Molina Healthcare 
of Ind. v. Henderson, No. 1:06-cv-1483-JDT-WTL, 2006 WL 3518269, at *7-9 (S.D. 
Ind. Dec. 4, 2006); Bertrand v. Maram, No. 05 C 0544, 2006 WL 2735494, at *5 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 25, 2006), aff’d, 495 F.3d 452 (7th Cir. 2007); M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 445 F. 
Supp. 2d 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Bio-Med. Applications of N.C., Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. 
Corp., 412 F. Supp. 2d 549, 553 (E.D.N.C. 2006); Clark v. Richman, 339 F. Supp. 2d 
631, 637 (M.D. Pa. 2004); Watson v. Thorne, No. 03-227-JE, 2004 WL 1445113, at *2 
(D. Or. Jun. 24, 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 
1152 (9th Cir. 2006); Sanders ex rel. Rayl v. Kan. Dep’t of Soc. and Rehab. Servs., 317 
F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1249-50 (D. Kan. 2004); Ass’n of Residential Res. in Minn. v. Minn. 
Comm’r of Human Servs., No. Civ.03-2438(JRT/FLN), 2003 WL 22037719, at *5 (D. 
Minn. Aug. 29, 2003); M.A.C. v. Betit, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1305-08 (D. Utah. 
2003); Burlington United Methodist Family Servs., Inc. v. Atkins, 227 F. Supp. 2d 
593, 596 n.3 (S.D. W. Va. 2002); Am. Soc’y of Consultant Pharmacists v. Concannon, 
214 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D. Me. 2002). 
 154 See, e.g., Doe v. Kidd, 501 F.3d 348, 355-56 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. 
Ct. 1483 (2008) (relying on Blessing); Spry v. Thompson, 487 F.3d 1272, 1275-76 
(9th Cir. 2007) (relying on circuit precedent); Okla. Chapter of the Am. Acad. of 
Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 472 F.3d 1208, 1214-15 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 
68 (2007) (relying on circuit precedent); Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of 
Human Servs., 443 F.3d 1005, 1014-15 (8th Cir. 2006) (arguing that Gonzaga did not 
alter precedent; even if it did, decisions in this litigation would have been correct); 
Clayworth v. Bonta, 140 F. App’x 677, 678-79 (9th Cir. 2005) (relying on circuit 
history); Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2003) (ignoring Gonzaga); Rolland 
v. Romney, 318 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2003) (appearing to ignore Gonzaga 
modification of Blessing); Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 88-89 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(acknowledging Gonzaga but relying on Blessing test); Barton v. Summers, 293 F.3d 
944, 953-54 (6th Cir. 2002) (ignoring Gonzaga); Queer v. Westmoreland County, No. 
2:06-cv-325, 2007 WL 2407283, slip op. at *7 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2007) (ignoring 
Blessing and Gonzaga); Lewis v. Rendell, 501 F. Supp. 2d 671, 686-88 (E.D. Pa. 2007) 
(relying on circuit precedent pre- and post-Gonzaga and Blessing test); Clark K. v. 
Guinn, No. 2:06-CV-1068-RCJ-RJJ, 2007 WL 1435428 (D. Nev. May 14, 2007) 
(relying on circuit precedent); Katie A. v. Bonta, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1070-71 (C.D. 
Cal. 2006), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Katie A. ex rel. Ludin v. L.A. County, 481 
F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2007); Beeker v. Olszewski, 415 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 
2006) (relying primarily on Wilder); A.G. ex rel. Giddens v. Arnold, No. 
5:05CV2790C10GRJ, 2006 WL 334218, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2006) (ignoring 
Gonzaga); Rosie D. v. Romney, 410 F. Supp. 2d 18, 52 (D. Mass. 2006) (relying on 
circuit precedent); Protestant Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Maram, No. 5-CV-03-DRH, 
2005 WL 2464460, at *4-5 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2005) (ignoring both Gonzaga and 
Blessing but employing Wilder); Kapable Kids Learning Ctr., Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of 
Human Servs., 420 F. Supp. 2d 956, 959-62 (E.D. Ark. 2005) (ignoring Gonzaga); 
Mejia ex rel. Ramirez v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 3381(GBD), 2004 WL 
2884407, at *9-11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2004) (ignoring Gonzaga); Ball v. Biedess, No. 
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a line of federal court cases that created an additional circuit split 
based upon a definition of “medical assistance” that asserts Medicaid is 
only a source of money.155  At least two important possibilities arise 
from this double circuit split:  first, the Roberts Court may revisit 
Gonzaga in the context of Medicaid entitlements; and second, the 
Court can affect Medicaid deeply by denying petitions for certiorari in 
cases that allow decisions to stand that limit private causes of action 
and that limit the courts’ understanding of the Medicaid program. 
1. Patterns in the Uneven Application of Gonzaga 
Though Gonzaga applies to all private attempts to redress violations 
of federal law through § 1983 claims, this section will focus on 
studying Medicaid-related claims.  There are multiple Medicaid Act 
provisions that enrollees seek to enforce, but three foundational 
statutory sections account for many splits among federal circuit 
courts.  These statutory provisions mandate certain elements for state 
Medicaid plans to qualify for federal funding under Medicaid; as states 
must comply with these terms to receive federal funding, these are 
classic conditions on Spending Clause legislation that create a 
cooperative federalism program.  The three provisions are 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(8), the “reasonable promptness” provision; 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(10), the “minimum services” provision (which also 
encompasses “comparability”); and 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A), the 
“equal access” provision, which is the current statutory adaptation of 
the repealed Boren Amendment.156 
 
CIV00-0067-TUC-EHC, 2004 WL 2566262, at *5-6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2004), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ball, 492 F.3d 1094 (relying on circuit precedent); In re 
NYAHSA Litig., 318 F. Supp. 2d 30, 38 (N.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d per curiam sub nom. 
N.Y. Ass’n of Homes & Servs. for the Aging v. DeBuono, 444 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(relying on Blessing test, though mentioning Gonzaga for “creating rights” language); 
Mendez v. Brown, 311 F. Supp. 2d 134, 137-40 (D. Mass. 2004) (relying primarily on 
Blessing, but also analyzing Medicaid provisions in question under Gonzaga in 
response to defendant’s arguments that Gonzaga is new standard); Kerr v. Holsinger, 
No. Civ.A.03-68-H, 2004 WL 882203, at *3-4 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 25, 2004) (ignoring 
Gonzaga); Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Health, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1333 (D.N.M. 2003) 
(ignoring Gonzaga); Collins ex rel. Collins v. Hamilton, 231 F. Supp. 2d 840, 847 
(S.D. Ind. 2002), aff’d, 349 F.3d 371 (7th Cir. 2003) (ignoring Gonzaga); Wilson-
Coker v. Thompson, 222 F. Supp. 2d 190, 196-97 (D. Conn. 2002) (relying primarily 
on Blessing and circuit precedent pre-Gonzaga); Martin v. Taft, 222 F. Supp. 2d 940, 
975-79 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (ignoring Gonzaga); Alexander A. ex rel. Barr v. Novello, 210 
F.R.D. 27, 35 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (ignoring Gonzaga). 
 155 See Bruggeman, 324 F.3d at 910. 
 156 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (2006) (“A State plan for medical assistance 
must . . . provide that all individuals wishing to make application for medical 
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Circuit courts that have addressed enrollee enforcement of the 
reasonable promptness provision often also addressed the minimum 
services provision and/or the equal access provision.  Prior to 
Gonzaga, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals provided the standard 
for parsing the reasonable promptness provision in Doe v. Chiles, 
which held that developmentally disabled individuals could seek 
redress for failure to provide Medicaid-promised services under 
§ 1983.157  After Gonzaga, most circuit courts have upheld the private 
enforceability of the reasonable promptness provision,158 but some 
district courts have taken reasonable promptness claims as 
opportunities to declare that no private rights can be enforced under 
the Medicaid Act pursuant to Gonzaga.159 
Circuit courts that have addressed the minimum services provision 
 
assistance under the plan shall have opportunity to do so, and that such assistance 
shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals . . . .”); 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (“A State plan for medical assistance must . . . provide — (A) 
for making medical assistance available, including at least the care and services listed 
in paragraphs (1) through (5), (17) and (21) of [§] 1905a(a), to — all individuals — 
. . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (“A State plan for medical assistance must . . . 
provide such methods and procedures relating to the utilization of, and the payment 
for, care and services available under the plan . . . as may be necessary to safeguard 
against unnecessary utilization of such care and services and to assure that payments 
are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist 
enough providers so that care and services are available under the plan at least to the 
extent that such care and services are available to the general population in the 
geographic area . . . .”). 
 157 See Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 714-19 (11th Cir. 1998).  The decision also 
addressed sovereign immunity, finding that the Ex parte Young doctrine permitted the 
district court to award injunctive relief to the plaintiffs.  See id. at 720-21. 
 158 See Kidd, 501 F.3d at 356, cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1483 (Mar. 3, 2008) (No. 07-
913); Bertrand, 495 F.3d at 457-58; Fogarty, 472 F.3d at 1214; Mandy R. v. Owens, 464 
F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 2006) (assuming that § 1983 allows private parties to 
challenge reasonable promptness provision and minimum care and services provision), 
cert. denied Mandy R. v. Ritter, 127 S. Ct. 1905 (2007); Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 
454 F.3d 532, 540-42 (6th Cir. 2006); Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 
192 (3d Cir. 2004); Bryson, 308 F.3d at 88-89.  The First Circuit decided a related case 
in 2005 and upheld its opinion in Bryson v. Shumway.  See Rullan, 397 F.3d at 73-75 
(allowing § 1983 cause of action to require payment review for federally qualified health 
centers in Puerto Rico, and relying on similar decision by Second Circuit in Community 
Health Center v. Wilson-Coker, 311 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2002)). 
 159 See, e.g., M.A.C. v. Betit, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1307-08 (D. Utah 2003) 
(rejecting analyses of circuit courts that found reasonable promptness provision to be 
enforceable after Gonzaga, and holding provision unenforceable for lack of rights-
creating language); Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Houston, 245 F. Supp. 2d 653, 657, 660-61 
(E.D. Pa. 2003) (explaining that Medicaid Act is never privately enforceable under 
theory that no third-party beneficiary rights exist under Spending Clause legislation), 
overturned by Sabree, 367 F.3d at 180. 
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have allowed Medicaid enrollees to seek redress through § 1983.  The 
Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have permitted 
Medicaid enrollees to enforce the Medicaid Act through § 1983, even 
applying Gonzaga to the claims.160  The circuit courts have determined 
that the minimum services provision creates an enforceable right 
through § 1983 because the statutory language is framed in terms of 
individual rights to medical assistance.161  In analyzing and adopting the 
post-Gonzaga analysis of the Third and Fifth Circuits, the Ninth Circuit 
found the language of the minimum services provision (“A State 
plan . . . must provide for making medical assistance available . . . to all 
individuals”) indistinguishable from the language in Titles VI and IX 
that the Gonzaga Court used as an example of clearly created individual 
rights enforceable through § 1983.162  The trick to minimum services 
claims, however, is that the plaintiffs must be within a category of 
eligibility that entitles them to the claimed benefit; even if the plaintiffs 
are within that category, if the benefit is optional rather than 
mandatory, the state can apply for a waiver or amend its State plan to 
avoid the plaintiffs’ § 1983 action.  An example of this kind of 
gamesmanship occurred in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision 
Lankford v. Sherman and prevented that court from determining 
whether minimum services are still enforceable after Gonzaga.163 
Federal appellate courts that have addressed the enforceability of the 
equal access provision have determined that providers, and sometimes 
enrollees, no longer have the ability to privately enforce the terms of 
the Medicaid statute.164  A handful of cases highlight the trends 
 
 160 See Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1159-62 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied 127 S. 
Ct. 598 (2006); S.D. ex rel. Dickson v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 603 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(explaining that minimum services provision contains “precisely the sort of ‘rights-
creating’ language identified in Gonzaga as critical to demonstrating a congressional 
intent to establish a new right”); Sabree, 367 F.3d at 190 (“[I]t [is] difficult, if not 
impossible, as a linguistic matter, to distinguish the import of the relevant [Medicaid 
Act] language — ‘A State plan must provide’ — from the ‘No person shall’ language of 
Titles VI and IX.”). 
 161 See, e.g., Watson, 436 F.3d at 1160-61.  The court wrote, “This language is 
unmistakably focused on the specific individuals . . . who meet eligibility 
requirements.”  Id. at 1160.  A related provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17), was not 
enforceable through § 1983.  See id. at 1162-63. 
 162 See id. at 1160-61. 
 163 See Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 506 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 164 Most recently the Fifth Circuit so held.  See Equal Access for El Paso v. 
Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 703-04 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that healthcare providers 
and enrollees could not force Texas to increase payment rates to Medicaid providers in 
effort to force state to comply with equal access provision, overruling pre-Gonzaga 
decision in Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908 (5th Cir. 2000), to 
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regarding denying private enforcement of the equal access provision 
after Gonzaga.  The Third Circuit augured the Gonzaga decision by 
three months in holding that pharmacists could not enforce the 
Medicaid equal access provision.165  Then-Judge Alito reasoned that 
Congress did not intend to benefit Medicaid providers in enacting the 
equal access provision, and thus, they had no federal right that could 
be enforced under § 1983.166  The majority stated in dicta that 
enrollees could enforce the equal access provision, or DHHS should 
ensure that states are administering their Medicaid plans as 
required.167  As a result of Gonzaga, the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
also held that providers had no § 1983 cause of action to enforce the 
equal access provision, which reversed that circuit’s position.168  Next, 
the Ninth Circuit went a step further and decided that the equal access 
provision does not provide individuals a right that is enforceable after 
Gonzaga because the provision contains general language about 
requirements for state participation in Medicaid rather than an 
articulated individual right.169  Thus, after Gonzaga, no § 1983 action 
by Medicaid providers or enrollees would be allowed in the Ninth 
Circuit under the equal access provision, but the opinion 
distinguished the reasonable promptness and minimum services 
provisions as permissible.170  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also 
held that the equal access provision could not be privately enforced by 
providers or enrollees after Gonzaga, though pre-Gonzaga the court 
 
extent it allowed enrollees to enforce statutory rights under equal access provision). 
 165 See Pa. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 541-42 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(enrollees were not party to action). 
 166 See id. at 536 (stating “it would be outlandish to argue that the Wilder/Blessing 
intended-to-benefit requirement permits … 30(A) claims in federal court”); id. at 538 
(reasoning that repeal of Boren Amendment and creation of equal access provision 
prevented interpreting 30(A) as federal right for Medicaid healthcare providers).  The 
Third Circuit knowingly rejected the circuit decisions allowing Medicaid providers to 
enforce the equal access provision.  See id. at 542.   
 167 See id. at 543-44.  Judge Becker’s dissent vehemently disagreed and decried the 
belief that Medicaid enrollees could enforce the equal access provision without joining 
forces with Medicaid providers given the “severe financial hardship” enrollees suffer.  
Id. at 559 (Becker, J., dissenting). 
 168 See Long Term Care Pharmacy Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 57-59 (1st 
Cir. 2004) (enrollees were not party to action).  The court in Long Term Care noted 
the circuit divide that predated Gonzaga and questioned whether Gonzaga would 
result in a “tidal shift or merely a shift in emphasis.”  Id. at 58-59. 
 169 See Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 
Rosenbaum, supra note 14, at 34-35.  In July 2007, the Ninth Circuit reiterated the 
Sanchez holding but permitted enforcement of Medicaid’s “free choice” provisions.  
See Ball v. Rodgers, 492 F.3d 1094, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 170 See Sanchez, 416 F.3d at 1059. 
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roundly rejected a notorious district court decision that would have 
eliminated all private causes of action for Spending Clause 
legislation.171 
Finally, the Supreme Court was poised to decide a case on the 
triangle of Spending Clause jurisprudence, § 1983, and Medicaid, but 
the respondents settled the case and the Court issued a Disposal by 
Summary Action in Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care.172  The Eighth 
Circuit issued three decisions in this litigation, and despite the 
intervening decision in Gonzaga, each of the decisions favored the 
private parties seeking redress through § 1983, which included both 
providers and enrollees in the Arkansas Medicaid program.173  A 2002 
opinion held that both the Medicaid providers and parents of enrollees 
could enforce Medicaid requirements via § 1983 against both the 
Arkansas Department of Human Services (“ADHS”) and its officers.174  
The circuit court remanded the case for further proceedings, but it 
returned to the appellate level in 2004.175  The Eighth Circuit 
primarily reviewed the district court’s holding that failure to conduct a 
study to determine the implications of terminating services for special 
needs children was a violation of the equal access provision and the 
injunction prohibiting Arkansas from terminating services until an 
impact study was conducted.176  The Eighth Circuit agreed that such a 
study was a prerequisite to terminating Medicaid services due to the 
 
 171 See Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 540-43 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(rejecting private causes of action under § 1983 to enforce equal access provision and 
adopting Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of “medical assistance”); Westside Mothers 
v. Olszewski, 289 F.3d 852, 857-63 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting district court’s literal 
contract analysis for Spending Clause legislation and permitting § 1983 cause of 
action to enforce Medicaid programmatic requirements); Westside Mothers v. 
Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 575-76, 584 & n.20, 585 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (calling 
federal spending program contracts that did not create federal law unprotected by 
Supremacy Clause, avoiding Ex parte Young by declaring Michigan’s officers immune 
from suit, and rejecting use of  § 1983 to enforce Medicaid provisions specifically and 
Spending Clause legislation generally). 
 172 See 127 S. Ct. 3000, 3000 (2007). 
 173 Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. (Pediatric III), 443 
F.3d 1005, 1015-16 (8th Cir. 2006); Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of 
Human Servs. (Pediatric II), 364 F.3d 925, 927-28 (8th Cir. 2004); Pediatric Specialty 
Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. (Pediatric I), 293 F.3d 472, 477-78 (8th Cir. 
2002). 
 174 See Pediatric I, 293 F.3d at 477-80.  This decision primarily hinged upon the 
court’s interpretation of the minimum care and services provision, 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(10).  Id. at 479 n.5.  The equal access provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30), 
was not mentioned in the 2002 decision. 
 175 See Pediatric II, 364 F.3d at 928-29. 
 176 See id.   
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property interest Medicaid enrollees have in their benefits and the 
procedural due process claims that arise when proper methods are not 
used for withdrawing Medicaid benefits.177 
The circuit court issued its third opinion in Pediatric Specialty Care 
in 2006, and this go-round focused on the district court’s damages 
award against past and present officers of ADHS and against ADHS as 
an agency.178  Additionally, the Eighth Circuit considered Gonzaga’s 
impact on its equal access provision analysis.179  The opinion rejected 
the ADHS position that Gonzaga foreclosed all private causes of action 
to enforce provisions of the Medicaid Act and held that the equal 
access provision facilitates a cause of action for providers and 
enrollees alike.180  Because the state officers appeared to be responsible 
for violations of the equal access provision and other elements of the 
Medicaid Act, the Eighth Circuit denied summary judgment based on 
Eleventh Amendment immunity for the officers as to both monetary 
damages and injunctive relief, but the court dismissed ADHS from the 
case based on state sovereign immunity.181 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the state officers, whose 
brief argued both immunity from damages and the plaintiffs’ inability 
to enforce the Medicaid equal access provision under § 1983.182  This 
 
 177 See id. at 930-31.  The Eighth Circuit did not agree, however, that the state’s 
actions violated substantive due process.  See id. at 931-32. 
 178 See Pediatric III, 443 F.3d at 1008-09, 1017.  Experts testified that ADHS 
restricted the care that could be approved for special needs children, contrary to the 
actual medical needs of the children.  See id. at 1010.  A private contractor for ADHS 
testified that it could approve only three and a half hours of care per day, even though 
six is generally medically indicated, and that doctors produced boiler-plate denials of 
care to facilitate the process of denying enrollees’ claims.  See id.  The plaintiffs alleged 
that the state encouraged this conduct and that it supported deceptive behavior by the 
private contractor so that appeals would never be fruitful for the enrollee.  See id. at 
1011.  A registered nurse who had worked for the contractor was certain that it was 
motivated to cut costs and services below the point intended by ADHS so that the 
contract would continue to be renewed.  See id. at 1011-12.   
 179 See id. at 1013-16.  The court also reviewed Gonzaga’s impact on the first 
Pediatric Specialty Services decision.  See id. at 1013-14. 
 180 See id. at 1015. 
 181 See id. at 1017. 
 182 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit at 9-11, 20-21, Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1356 
(2006) (No. 06-415), 2006 WL 2726551.  Arkansas wrote that the “more basic 
question is whether there is a private statutory right entitling the plaintiffs to litigate 
that issue under § 1983.  The state’s position is that no federal statute creates any right 
to receive Medicaid services that are not medically necessary as determined by [the 
state].”  Id. at 4-5.  The physicians who made those determinations were accused of 
denying care to keep their contract with the state, a decision that has no connection to 
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would have presented an intriguing combination of issues for the 
Roberts Court, as it would have facilitated discussion of both private 
enforcement actions for Spending Clause legislation under § 1983 and 
an exploration of sovereign immunity for state officers, perhaps even a 
revisiting of the Ex parte Young doctrine.183  After meeting with the 
Solicitor General’s office, however, the respondents withdrew the 
damages claims against the ADHS officers and permitted the Court to 
vacate and dismiss with prejudice the 2006 Eighth Circuit decision 
with regard to the individual claims against the state officers.184 
The variations in circuit courts’ determinations regarding 
enforceability of these foundational Medicaid provisions have at least 
three implications.  First, the uncertainty regarding enforcement 
among the circuits indicates the degree to which Gonzaga has failed to 
“resolve any ambiguities.”185  Gonzaga resulted in an about-face on the 
equal access provision, though circuit courts appear relatively 
comfortable allowing private enforcement of the reasonable 
promptness provision and the minimum services provision.186  
Nevertheless, these decisions often split the proverbial baby, as 
enrollees frequently raise all three provisions in litigation.187  Also, 
they divide enrollees and providers, who were best able to work 
together to defeat inadequate state actions under the equal access 
provision.188  Medicaid enrollees are poor, medically fragile, often 
 
medical necessity.  See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7-10, 
Selig, 127 S. Ct. 1356 (No. 06-415), 2006 WL 3419817.   
 183 See supra note 15. 
 184 See Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 3000, 3000 (2007) 
(granting certiorari and vacating judgment in Pediatric III); see also Petitioners’ 
Response to Respondents’ Suggestion of Mootness at 2-3, Selig, 127 S. Ct. 1356 (No. 
06-415).  The Tenth Circuit also held that the equal access provision was not 
enforceable under § 1983 after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Pediatric 
Specialty Care cases.  See Okla. Chapter of the Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 472 
F.3d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 68 (2007). 
 185  Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 278 (2002). 
 186 See supra notes 157-84 and accompanying text. 
 187 See, e.g., Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 539-44 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(finding that §§ 1396a(a)(8), 1396a(a)(10) are enforceable by § 1983 cause of action 
after Gonzaga but that § 1396a(a)(30)(A) is no longer enforceable). 
 188 As Chief Judge Becker’s dissent in Houstoun noted, Medicaid beneficiaries are 
not likely to be able to sue alone, as they are indigent by definition, and the opinion in 
Pennsylvania Pharmacists Ass’n does not square with Wilder.  See Pa. Pharmacists Ass’n 
v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 547-60 (3d Cir. 2002) (Becker, C.J., dissenting); see also 
Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 510 (1990).  Chief Judge Becker accused the 
Alito majority of deliberately narrowing the holding in Wilder, stating:  “[I]t is not our 
function to rewrite a Supreme Court opinion to narrow its holding . . . .”  Houstoun, 
283 F.3d at 554. 
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either minors or elderly, and generally politically disenfranchised.  
Joining forces with healthcare providers provides an advantage in 
litigation, as enrollees have a hard time gaining access to courts 
otherwise.  The Medicaid Act’s purpose, to create the same basic rights 
for all enrollees with flexibility for states to provide extra services for 
their citizens,189 is defeated by differing and changing interpretations 
in the federal circuits.190   
Second, if the equal access provision is no longer enforceable, then 
Wilder may no longer be supported by its statutory foundations and 
the precedent risks being overturned by a Court that appears 
interested in limiting § 1983 causes of action and in limiting the scope 
of conditions on Spending Clause legislation.191  The Roberts Court 
contains a majority that has demonstrated opposition to private 
enforcement of conditions on federal spending in any context.192  A 
number of federal appellate courts have determined that the equal 
access provision is unenforceable after Gonzaga.193  The equal access 
 
 189 Though many aspects of state Medicaid coverage are optional, the federal 
statutory scheme imposes an important floor regarding how little each state can 
provide and still be entitled to the open-ended funding that Medicaid provides.  See 
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Our Broken Healthcare System and How to Fix It:  An Essay on 
Health Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 537, 559-60 (2006) (noting that 
despite federal requirements for state participation in Medicaid, states still have leeway 
in providing benefits). 
 190 Congress envisioned Medicaid as an “egalitarian social contract for the poor” 
that mandated basic elements of each state’s Medicaid plan and that permitted 
optional elements of each State plan.  See RAND E. ROSENBLATT, SYLVIA A. LAW, & SARA 
ROSENBAUM, LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 416-17 (1997); see also 
STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 57 (noting that newly enacted Medicaid program 
contained “important provisions for minimal coverage of specified types of care, 
which put Medicaid far beyond the Kerr-Mills program and were designed to lead to 
comprehensive care”). 
 191 Justice Stevens’s dissent in Gonzaga noted that the new requirement for 
unambiguous congressional intent “sub silentio overrules” Wilder and Wright because 
those cases allowed causes of action when the underlying statutes did not necessarily 
intend § 1983 to be a source of enforceable rights.  See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 
273, 300 n.8 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 192 See infra Part III.A.1.  Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s dissent in Wilder, 496 U.S. at 524-29, and wrote a concurrence in Blessing, 
520 U.S. 329, 349 (1997).  Justice Thomas joined the majorities in Barnes v. Gorman, 
536 U.S. 181, 187 (2002), and Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283.  Justice Alito addressed the 
issue as a judge on the Third Circuit in Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 
180, 181 (3d Cir. 2004).  Finally, Chief Justice Roberts wrote about the issue both as 
Deputy Solicitor General and while in private practice.  See Brief for Petitioners at 39-
43, Gonzaga, 536 U.S. 273 (No. 01-679); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 11, Wilder, 496 U.S. 498 (No. 88-2043). 
 193 See supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text. 
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provision is the successor to the repealed Boren Amendment, which 
was the basis for the all-important Wilder decision; thus, Wilder may 
be in jeopardy. 
Third, Medicaid is one statutory program by which Congress 
intended to deliver a comprehensive set of benefits to fragile 
populations.  Federal courts, nonetheless, have read some provisions 
to be enforceable by enrollees, some provisions to be enforceable by 
providers, and some provisions to be enforceable by no one.  Though 
the statutory framework is long and complex, inconsistent and 
variable enforcement possibilities can only confound the problem.  
The statute is not necessarily clarified by Arlington, in which the Court 
reformulated the standard for conditions on spending, demanding 
clear notice to the states.194  The Arlington clear notice standard favors 
the states, ignoring the idea of balance in a cooperative federalism 
program, and strengthening the Gonzaga modification of the first 
element of the Blessing test by narrowing the demand for an 
“unambiguously conferred right” to a “clearly” conferred right for a 
cause of action to exist under § 1983.195 
2. The Seventh Circuit Theory of Medical Assistance 
An additional circuit split also affects the Medicaid Act; the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals formulated a novel definition of “medical 
assistance” that a handful of additional circuits have adopted.  In 
Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, the Seventh Circuit considered whether 
Illinois violated the Medicaid Act by failing to provide intermediate 
care facilities in the northern part of the state to developmentally 
disabled adults.196  From the start, this decision was unconventional in 
the realm of Medicaid Act jurisprudence.  Rather than borrow the 
Supreme Court’s Wilder description of Medicaid as a “cooperative 
federal-state program through which the Federal Government 
provides financial assistance to States so that they may furnish medical 
care to needy individuals,” which many (if not all) other circuits had 
done,197 Judge Posner called the program one that “defrays certain 
medical expenses of individuals . . . who lack the wherewithal to pay 
 
 194 See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006).   
 195 Id. (analyzing conditions placed on spending from perspective of state agreeing 
to federal funds). 
 196 See Bruggeman ex rel. Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 908 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 197 See, e.g., Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 714 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Wilder, 496 
U.S. at 502) (borrowing Court’s Wilder-based description of Medicaid program). 
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the expenses themselves.”198  The subsequent statutory analysis 
determined that “medical assistance” indicates financial assistance, not 
access to medical services, contrary to the interpretations of the First 
and Eleventh Circuits, who were accused of missing the 
“distinction.”199  The Seventh Circuit wrote that Medicaid is a 
“payment scheme, not a scheme for state-provided medical assistance” 
and held that the reasonable promptness provision was not violated by 
the state’s failure to distribute intermediate care facilities to all 
qualified citizens.200 
Judge Posner distorted the fundamental nature of Medicaid with 
that short description.  His definition of Medicaid as merely money 
rather than a program of medical care and access is a revisionist 
reading that is contrary to conventional designs for and 
understandings of Medicaid.201  Legislative history from the passage of 
the Medicaid Act consistently uses the term “medical assistance” to 
indicate something more than just money.202  Though the legislative 
 
 198 Bruggeman, 324 F.3d at 908. 
 199 See id. at 910 (citing Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 81, 88-89 (1st Cir. 
2002); Chiles, 136 F.3d at 714, 717). The First and Eleventh Circuits were the only 
two circuits to address private enforcement of the reasonable promptness provision at 
the time Bruggeman was decided and thus the only decisions addressed by the Seventh 
Circuit in this regard. 
 200 See id.  The court held that all of the Medicaid Act claims failed and noted that 
some were insufficient for private causes of action after Gonzaga and the “Supreme 
Court’s hostility . . . implying such rights in spending statutes.”  Id. at 911. 
 201 See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 52.  Medicare and Medicaid had 
dissimilar philosophical foundations; while Medicare was structured like Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield insurance programs, Medicaid “was based not on the insurance 
principles of specified benefits for specified contributions but on the time-worn 
structure of federal grants-in-aid to states for medical assistance . . . .  [P]rovision of 
medical care to the poor appeared at last to be accepted as a national problem . . . .”  
Id.  The legislation that preceded Medicaid, called Kerr-Mills for the bill’s sponsors, 
underlined the idea that Medicaid was intended to provide more than money; 
Congress had passed Kerr-Mills with an “expectation that each state would indeed 
provide adequate care so that a national problem would be avoided.”  Id. at 29 
(emphasis added).  Stevens and Stevens further note: 
Kerr-Mills was built on the dilemma that foreshadowed Medicaid.  If benefits 
for the medically indigent were to be viewed as a program of health services, 
there was no actual virtue in attaching them administratively to a program of 
public assistance cash benefits . . . .  Kerr-Mills . . . was both a reflection of 
inadequate medical services to those with low and middle incomes and an 
extension of traditional notions of cash assistance under welfare programs. 
Id. at 36 (emphasis added). 
 202 See S. REP. NO. 89-404, at 9 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1950.  
The legislative history declared:  “[T]o provide a more effective Kerr-Mills medical 
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history does refer to assistance with medical costs, the goal in 
improving the precursor Kerr-Mills medical assistance program and 
creating Medicaid was something more.  In creating Medicaid, 
Congress strove not only to match money for the states but also to 
ensure that “Medical assistance [is] made available to all individuals 
receiving money payments under these programs and [that] the 
medical care or services available to all such individuals [are] equal in 
amount, duration, and scope.”203  The language used to describe 
Medicaid also is different from that used for Medicare, passed in the 
same amendment to the Social Security Act, which called its basic plan 
“Hospital Insurance” and clearly was modeled on Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield.204  The legislative history demonstrates that Congress modified 
the medical assistance program to require states “to provide inpatient 
hospital services, outpatient hospital services” and other enumerated 
services; in other words, the states accepting Medicaid money must 
provide services, not just money, to enrollees, which is something that 
Kerr-Mills did not require.205   
Despite historical and legislative evidence that Medicaid is more 
than “financial assistance” and despite the Seventh Circuit’s limited 
statutory reading,206 the Sixth and Tenth Circuits have adopted the 
Bruggeman interpretation of medical assistance.207  The Sixth Circuit 
 
assistance program for the aged and to extend its provisions to additional needy persons, 
the bill would establish a single and separate medical care program to consolidate and 
expand the differing provisions for the needy . . . .”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 203 Id. 
 204 See id. at 4; see also PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
MEDICINE 374-75 (1982) (describing plan to make Medicare look like Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield so that hospitals and physicians would participate in plan of which they 
were wary). 
 205 See S. REP. NO. 89-404, at 73-74, as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1951, 
2014-15; see also MEDICAID COMM’N, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS vi (2006), 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/medicaid/122906rpt.pdf (stating that Medicaid “can and must 
continue to provide quality care to promote the best possible health for all beneficiaries”) 
(emphasis added). 
 206 One circuit court highlights an additional problem with the Seventh Circuit’s 
definition of “medical assistance” —  it is read alone rather than in the context of the 
statute.  See Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190, 192 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that 
any one of statutes that comprise Medicaid Act “is difficult to decipher if read either 
independently of the history of the program or in isolation from other provisions of 
the Medicaid Act”). 
 207 See Okla. Chapter of the Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 472 F.3d 1208, 
1214 (10th Cir. 2007); Mandy R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 2006); 
Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 540 (6th Cir. 2006).  In 2007, the 
Seventh Circuit allowed that a reasonable promptness claim could proceed in Illinois.  
See Bertrand ex rel. Bertrand v. Maram, 495 F.3d 452, 456-58 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that medical assistance under 
Medicaid requires the state to provide actual services.  It also held, 
however, that under the reasonable promptness provision all eligible 
people could apply for Medicaid and receive prompt financial 
assistance upon enrolling, and that the minimum services provision 
required the state to pay for certain enumerated items of medical 
care.208  The court did not preclude the plaintiffs from reframing their 
argument that failure to pay enough frustrates the application of the 
reasonable promptness and the minimum services provisions, but it 
did reject the § 1983 claim for better payment under the equal access 
provision.209  The Tenth Circuit twice has addressed the Posner 
reading of medical assistance.  In both instances it adopted the 
Seventh Circuit’s interpretation while still allowing claims to proceed, 
agreeing with the Sixth Circuit that the reasonable promptness and 
minimum services provisions theoretically were enforceable under § 
1983 and rejecting claims under the equal access provision.210  The 
Third Circuit declined to consider the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation 
of medical assistance, and the Fifth Circuit apparently ignored it.211 
The Seventh Circuit’s version of medical assistance is problematic for 
at least three reasons.  First, it creates circuit court divisions where they 
might not otherwise exist.  Though circuits reviewing the reasonable 
promptness and the minimum services provisions generally have upheld 
§ 1983 enforceability, these same circuits do not agree on the meaning 
of medical assistance.  This adds to the confusion resulting from the 
Gonzaga divide, but thus far the Court has denied petitions for certiorari 
in these cases, thereby allowing this definition to persist.212   
 
 208 See Westside Mothers, 454 F.3d at 540. 
 209 See id. at 541-43. 
 210 See Mandy R., 464 F.3d at 1142-43, 1147-48 (adopting Posner interpretation 
and agreeing with Sixth Circuit that reasonable promptness provision and minimum 
services provision are still redressable under § 1983).  The Tenth Circuit determined 
that the plaintiffs’ claim of too few services was not sufficiently linked to the lack of 
money, or underfunding, and thus the “State must pay for medical services, but it 
need not provide them.”  Id. at 1146.  One year later, the Tenth Circuit reiterated its 
Mandy R. analysis and rejected the district court’s holding that low rates of 
reimbursement effectively deny care by virtue of reducing the number of healthcare 
providers enrollees can see, thereby defeating the reasonable promptness and 
minimum services provisions.  See Fogarty, 472 F.3d at 1214-15 (applying medical 
assistance as money theory and rejecting plaintiff’s assertion that rates were too low to 
have appropriate numbers of providers participating in Medicaid program). 
 211 See S.D. ex rel. Dickinson v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 605 n.31 (5th Cir. 2004); 
Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 181 n.1 (3d Cir. 2004) (declaring 
circuit split matter for district court). 
 212 See Fogarty, 472 F.3d at 1208, cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 68 (2007); Mandy R., 464 
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Second, the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation is inconsistent with the 
statutory definition of medical assistance as the definition applies to the 
total Medicaid Act.213  This leads to a disconnect where, for example, 
courts permit states to reimburse so little that their Medicaid programs 
are virtually ineffective, while admonishing them to pay promptly when 
they do pay.214  Under this analysis, a state must agree to provide money 
while not ensuring that the Medicaid program it has promised to its 
citizens and to the Secretary of DHHS actually is effective.  This is 
contrary to the congressional intent in establishing Medicaid as a 
program that provides “care and services” to the needy.215   
 
F.3d at 1139, cert. denied sub nom. Mandy R. v. Ritter, 127 S. Ct. 1905 (2007). 
 213 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2006) (providing that “‘medical assistance’ means 
payment of part or all of the cost of the following care and services . . .” and 
delineating 28 items that must be covered by state).  Though standing alone this 
provision refers only to payment, read within the context of the entire statutory 
scheme (even setting aside legislative history), interpreting medical assistance as mere 
payment is not consistent with its use throughout the Medicaid Act, wherein medical 
assistance consistently indicates provision of care and services.  For example, the 
minimum services provision requires that a State plan “provide for making medical 
assistance available, including at least the care and services listed . . . to all individuals 
[who qualify].”  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (2006); see also Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 20-21, Okla. Chapter of the Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Fogarty, No. 06-
1482 (10th Cir. May 7, 2007).  The brief also describes how interpreting the free 
choice provision with the Posner definition of medical assistance is difficult, given 
that the free choice provision requires the State plan to allow “any individual eligible 
for medical assistance (including drugs)” to “obtain such assistance from any 
institution, agency, community pharmacy, or person, qualified to perform the service 
or services required . . . .”  See id. at 21 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)). 
 214 See Kenneth R. Wiggins, Medicaid and the Enforceable Right to Receive Medical 
Assistance:  The Need for a  Definition of “Medical Assistance,” 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1487, 1509 (2006) (noting that Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of medical assistance 
would render minimum services provision ineffective). 
 215 See, e.g., Fogarty, 472 F.3d 1208, 1215.  The court wrote: 
[T]he Medicaid Act requires participating states to provide beneficiaries 
financial assistance rather than actual medical services.  Thus, not only do 
the statutes cited by plaintiffs not obligate defendants to ensure that EPSDT 
services are “fully” delivered to the plaintiff class, those statutes impose no 
obligation whatsoever on defendants to deliver any medical services.  Rather 
. . . defendants’ obligation under these statutes is to pay promptly for the 
medical services outlined in the Medicaid Act, including EPSDT services. 
Id.; see also S. Rep. No. 89-404, at 74, as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1951, 2015 
(adding provisions to Medicaid that require “a consistent statewide program at a 
reasonable level of adequacy” and emphasizing that states must “utilize a sufficient 
number of trained and qualified personnel in the administration of the program 
including both medical and other professional staff”).  The legislative history shows 
that Congress expects the states to “bring about progressive improvement in the level 
of institutional care and services provided to recipients of medical assistance . . . .  
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Third, this interpretation of medical assistance, when read in 
conjunction with the DRA, may prevent private enforcement of that 
provision, which up to this point has been enforceable even after 
Gonzaga.  This is true even though this interpretation does not 
currently prevent private enforcement of the minimum services 
provision under traditional Medicaid.  As described above, the DRA 
Benchmark Provision permits states to alter State plans so that the 
actuarial equivalent of Medicaid is provided to enrollees, which means 
that states only have to provide premium support rather than 
particular services as delineated in the minimum services provision.216  
If medical assistance only means money, and the minimum services 
provision can be eliminated from a state’s Medicaid plan by virtue of 
the DRA, then enrollees have no benefit to enforce under § 1983.  The 
same problem exists with the reasonable promptness provision — it 
becomes spectral given that money but no benefit is promised.  
Medicaid enrollees could be effectively prevented from enforcing the 
access to medical care that has been secured historically by § 1983 
claims for specific benefits based on the Medicaid Act, because those 
benefits are no longer promised.217 
III. PROPOSED REMEDIES 
Assuming Judge Alito’s prophetic concurrence in Sabree is correct, 
Medicaid benefits are in danger of being limited to the agreement 
 
[T]he State plan must . . . assure that . . . such care and services will be provided, in a 
manner consistent with simplicity of administration and the best interests of the 
recipient.”  Id. at 76-77. 
 216 See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text. 
 217 Some think this would be a good thing.  See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, The Supreme 
Court Term That Was and the One That Will Be, FEDERALIST OUTLOOK, AMERICAN 
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FEDERALISM PROJECT, July 1, 2002, http://www.aei.org/ 
publications/pubID.15849/pub_detail.asp (analyzing Rehnquist Court’s anti-
entitlement federalism).  Mr. Greve wrote in analyzing the Gonzaga holding: 
Not much further down the road, the Supreme Court’s federalism will hit 
the mother of all entitlements, Medicaid.  Stripped of legal details, the 
central question in cases banging around in several federal circuits is 
whether Medicaid benefits are an entitlement for individuals or for the states.  
The former answer — Justice William Brennan’s answer, which is still 
enshrined in law — means that Medicaid benefits will be defined and 
enforced by Senator Hillary Clinton’s friends at the Children’s Defense Fund 
in some federal court. The latter answer implies that Medicaid benefits are 
shaped in a negotiating process between the states and the national 
government, with some prospect of cost control and good sense. 
Id. 
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between the federal government and states with limited recourse for 
enrollees who are not receiving the promised medical assistance.218  
Courts have consistently deemed claims based on the equal access 
provision unenforceable after Gonzaga, opening the door for Wilder to 
be overturned overtly.219  Even though federal appellate courts have 
upheld § 1983 private causes of action based on the reasonable 
promptness provision and the minimum services provision, the 
Seventh Circuit analysis of medical assistance, the Roberts Court’s 
expected hostility to enforcement of Spending Clause conditions 
through § 1983, and the Benchmark Provision leave little hope for 
individual plaintiffs, whether they be providers or enrollees. 
A. Why the Courts Are a Weakened Part of the Medicaid Safety Net 
Congress appears to believe that § 1983 is sufficient for Medicaid 
enforcement claims for both providers and enrollees.  This is 
evidenced by Congress’s actions after the Supreme Court decided in 
Suter v. Artist M. that a provision of the Adoption Assistance and Child 
Welfare Act was unenforceable through § 1983 because it imposed 
only generalized duties on a state and not individual rights.220  
Congress’s rejoinder was the “Suter fix,”221 federal legislation that 
responded directly to the Court’s decision by stating that in any action 
to enforce a provision of the Social Security Act (of which Medicaid is 
a part), private enforcement would not be prevented by the existence 
of a statutorily required state plan.222  In other words, Congress 
 
 218 See Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 194 (3d Cir. 2004) (Alito, 
J., concurring). 
 219 See supra notes 164-84 and accompanying text. 
 220 See 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992).  This decision also narrowed Thiboutot, discussed 
above.  See id. at 365-66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 77-81. 
 221 See, e.g., Ball v. Rodgers, 492 F.3d 1094, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007) (calling 
Congress’s actions “Suter fix”). 
 222 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2 reads in full: 
In an action brought to enforce a provision of the Social Security Act, such 
provision is not to be deemed unenforceable because of its inclusion in a 
section of the Act requiring a State plan or specifying the required contents 
of a State plan. This section is not intended to limit or expand the grounds 
for determining the availability of private actions to enforce State plan 
requirements other than by overturning any such grounds applied in Suter v. 
Artist M., but not applied in prior Supreme Court decisions respecting such 
enforceability; provided, however, that this section is not intended to alter 
the holding in Suter v. Artist M. that [§] 471(a)(15) of the Act is not 
enforceable in a private right of action.   
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2 (2006) (citations omitted). 
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expected Medicaid enrollees to be able to enforce their statutory rights 
through § 1983, thereby tacitly acknowledging reliance on Thiboutot 
and its progeny.223  As has been discussed herein, however, that line of 
case law is jeopardized by changes in the Court’s composition and the 
Court’s hostility to § 1983 claims to enforce conditions on spending.224  
Congress cannot rely on the assumption that federal statutory rights 
such as those found in the Medicaid Act will be enforceable through 
§ 1983.  Congress should take legislative action to provide the 
enforcement mechanisms it has intended should exist for Medicaid 
enrollees and providers. 
Some would respond that the Court intended this; if Congress wants 
a cause of action for Medicaid enrollees and providers, Congress 
should clearly state that intent in the language of the Medicaid Act.225  
After all, this is the objective of clear statement rules.226  Another issue 
exists, though, that is not necessarily addressed by statutory insertions 
into the Medicaid Act.  Justices currently sitting on the Supreme Court 
have suggested that conditions on spending can never be privately 
enforced through § 1983 because beneficiaries of cooperative 
federalism programs are the equivalent of third-party beneficiaries.227  
Though the cases in which the third-party beneficiary contract theory 
was advanced did not involve legislation that provided a private cause 
of action, the juridical skepticism regarding the structure and purpose 
of conditions on spending and the statutory entitlement that 
conditions can create should not be overlooked.  The contract analysis 
in Barnes may not be the last of the discussions regarding the 
Spending Clause power that suggest congressional exercises of this 
 
 223 See Chemerinsky, Ensuring, supra note 139, at 152-53 (noting that Congress has 
had opportunities to change Court’s interpretation of § 1983 since Thiboutot, and yet 
Congress has never acted to reverse that decision, and indeed reinforced it with “Suter 
fix”).  Professor Chemerinsky explains too that Congress rejected attempts to 
eliminate § 1983 as a cause of action four times, and President Clinton vetoed 
legislation that would have eliminated private causes of action.  Id. at 152. 
 224 As Professor Rosenbaum has noted, individual actions to enforce statutory 
obligations against states are “increasingly confined to selected program elements.”  
See Rosenbaum, supra note 14, at 23-24. 
 225 See Brian Galle, Getting Spending:  How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with 
Clear Thinking about Conditional Grants of Power, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 162-66 
(2004) (describing Rehnquist Court’s application of clear statement rules to variety of 
laws, not limited to Spending Clause legislation). 
 226 See id. at 183 (calling clear statement rules proxy for ideological federalism-
oriented ends); see also Merrill, supra note 121, at 827-28 (describing and defining 
clear statement rules during Rehnquist Court era).   
 227 See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280 (2002); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 
U.S. 181, 187 (2002); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 350 (1997). 
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enumerated power are somehow less viable than other sources of 
congressional authority.228 
Notably, Justices’ examination of § 1983’s legislative purpose can 
cut against the conclusion that § 1983 is unavailable for Medicaid 
enrollees and providers.  Section 1983 was created, as stated by the 
majority in Thiboutot, as Reconstruction Era legislation with remedial 
intent to prevent racial injustices.229  Allowing private enforcement of 
Medicaid conditions on states helps to ensure that the states do not 
treat disparately the populations that § 1983 originally protected.230  
Thwarting § 1983 causes of action is particularly troubling given the 
populations that receive the greatest benefit from Medicaid 
coverage.231  Indeed, allowing § 1983 causes of action against state 
officers arguably furthers the original intent of that statute’s creation 
(inasmuch as legislation created ninety years later can do); in many 
ways, the War on Poverty and Great Society programs, which helped 
to create the Medicaid Act, were an extension of the stymied civil 
rights movement following the Civil War.232   
Nevertheless, the jurisprudence regarding the triangle of Medicaid, 
the Spending Clause, and § 1983 has been steadily marching away 
from access for private parties.  Though the courts are not necessarily 
 
 228 See Barnes, 536 U.S. at 186; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause 
Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2008); Galle, supra note 225, 
at 168 (rejecting contract analogy of spending legislation as inconsistent with textual 
reading of power to spend for “general welfare”). 
 229 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1980). 
 230 One could argue that the parallels go even farther, as southern states 
statistically spend less on each Medicaid enrollee.  See Matthew, supra note 36, at 991 
(charting disparities in state Medicaid enrollment and expenditures using public 
information collected by DHHS).  Of course, if there were racial discrimination in the 
administration of programs such as Medicaid, a stand-alone cause of action would 
exist under § 1983. 
 231 See Sara Rosenbaum & David Rousseau, Medicaid at Thirty-Five, 45 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 7, 28-29 (2001) (reporting that African Americans, women, and children are 
populations primarily covered by Medicaid). 
 232 See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 42-48, 63-64 (describing how 
Medicaid grew out of Great Society and War on Poverty programs); see also Vernellia 
R. Randall, Racist Healthcare:  Reforming an Unjust Health Care System to Meet the 
Needs of African-Americans, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 127, 146-48 (1993) (explaining that 
disparities based on race in healthcare system were not addressed effectively during 
Reconstruction by Freedman Bureau and that during post-Reconstruction era African 
Americans were excluded from medical system by virtue of segregation and outright 
discrimination).  The Warren Court’s criminal rights decisions and the public’s initial 
embrace of those holdings as remedying racial inequities also demonstrate this kind of 
connection.  See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession:  The History of 
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 210-12 (2002). 
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correct to so move, it is hard to predict if the judicial branch will 
diverge from this course.  This Article thus suggests a new set of 
enforcement possibilities for this fragile set of statutory rights. 
B. Seeking Safety Elsewhere 
A question often arises:  why must enrollees and providers have the 
ability to privately enforce the Medicaid Act?233  States that participate 
in Medicaid must agree to comply with the statutes and regulations 
the federal government prescribes in creating State plans.234  If a state 
does not perform as required by federal law and the state’s own plan, it 
can be denied federal funds,235 as the Court has noted repeatedly and 
pointedly.236  Yet, in forty years of Medicaid, CMS has shown that it is 
not interested in the funding withdrawal remedy.237  CMS, which is 
responsible for Medicaid, is notoriously uninterested in enforcing the 
terms of State plans against the states; instead it seeks cooperation, 
when it makes demands at all.238  Even if CMS were active in enforcing 
 
 233 Violations of statutory entitlements are not the same as the federal government 
demanding “unconstitutional conditions” on the receipt of funds.  See, e.g., Lynn A. 
Baker, The Prices of Rights:  Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 
CORNELL L. REV. 1185, 1193-94 (1990) (describing unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine as one that “prohibits conditions on allocations in which the government 
indirectly impinges on a protected activity or choice in a way that would be 
unconstitutional if the same result had been achieved through a direct governmental 
command”).  Medicaid enrollees have no constitutionally protected right to healthcare 
that is impinged, as no constitutional right to healthcare exists for any American. 
 234 See 42 C.F.R. § 430.10 (2006). 
 235 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2006).  The Secretary of DHHS has the power to 
determine that a State plan “has been so changed that it no longer complies with the 
provisions of [§] 1396a . . . ; or that in the administration of the plan there is a failure 
to comply substantially with any such provision” after notice and an opportunity for a 
hearing, and then the Secretary can withhold all Medicaid payments or certain 
payments, continuing to pay for elements of the State plan that have not fallen out of 
compliance with the Medicaid Act.  Id.  The Secretary can withhold funds until the 
state complies.  Id. 
 236 E.g., Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981) (noting 
that for legislation enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, typical remedy for 
noncompliance is termination of federal funds). 
 237 See Key, supra note 65, at 292 (explaining that federal agencies seek state 
compliance rather than cutting off federal funds when states fail to comply with 
conditions on spending); see also Samberg-Champion, supra note 6, at 1839 (noting 
that denial of federal funds is “blunt and seldom-used club” for all federal funding 
programs in context of arguing that § 1983 claims are important enforcement tool, 
even after Gonzaga). 
 238 See JOST, supra note 4, at 89 (noting that Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (precursor to DHHS) only performed 16 State plan conformity hearings in 
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Medicaid withholding provisions, as Justice White noted in his 
Pennhurst dissent,239 removing a state from the program is a draconian 
measure that is not necessarily desirable or effective; this is especially 
true for a long-standing federal spending program such as Medicaid 
upon which many vulnerable citizens, and states, rely.240   
Medicaid is an important safety net,241 especially in an age when 
fewer and fewer Americans are able to access health insurance through 
employers.242  Although Congress never intended to cover every 
indigent person in need of medical assistance,243 the program still 
covers important and needy populations.244  Medicaid providers and 
enrollees cannot rely on states to provide Medicaid benefits as they are 
statutorily required to do, otherwise governors would not constantly 
seek flexibility, and the parade of litigation regarding Medicaid would 
not exist.245  States often defy the requirements of the Medicaid Act, 
and even when granted waivers, do not supply the benefits promised 
to Medicaid enrollees.  Also, under the DRA Benchmarking Provision, 
the promised benefit only need be an actuarial equivalent, but history 
indicates that states may try to circumvent even this loose 
 
first three decades of Medicaid program’s existence). 
 239 See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 52-53 (White, J., dissenting).  Justice White wrote 
that “a funds cutoff is a drastic remedy with injurious consequences to the supposed 
beneficiaries of the Act” in the context of the Developmentally Disabled Act, and the 
same is true for Medicaid beneficiaries.  Id. 
 240 See JOST, supra note 4, at 45-46 (explaining that courts traditionally were 
sympathetic to plight of Medicaid enrollees but that “today’s courts cannot always be 
depended on to protect the poor”). 
 241 See generally CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA SMITH, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE 
UNITED STATES:  2006 (2007), http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/p60-233.pdf.  
The percentage of people uninsured and the raw number of uninsured rose to 47 
million people, or about 15.8% of the population, in 2006.  See id. at 18.  The number 
and percentage of uninsured African Americans also rose, to 20.5% of that population 
(roughly 7.6 million people).  See id. at 19.   
 242 See id. at 18 (showing that 59.7% of people were covered by employer-based 
health insurance in 2006, down from 60.2% in 2005). 
 243 See, e.g., STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 63-65 (describing categories of 
eligibility under original Medicaid Act). 
 244 See Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 231, at 25-38 (describing populations 
served by Medicaid and ways in which program helps to battle disparities in care 
related to race, poverty, and sex); see, e.g., Kevin Sack, Study Finds Cancer Diagnosis 
Linked to Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2008, available at http://nytimes.com/2008/ 
02/18/health/18cancer.html (describing study that shows “uninsured and those 
covered by Medicaid are more likely” to be diagnosed with cancer in later stages of 
disease, which not only increases morbidity but also costs of treatment). 
 245 See supra Part III. 
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requirement.246  Providing Medicaid enrollees and healthcare providers 
with a cause of action has the added benefit of potentially aiding CMS 
to prevent states from gaming the Medicaid system through methods 
such as inter-governmental transfers (while not reducing funding, the 
current CMS proposal), a problem CMS admits it has struggled to 
prevent and that has interested Congress.247 
At least three approaches would bypass Medicaid’s judicial jeopardy.  
First, administrative remedies could be implemented to provide 
procedures where none currently exist for Medicaid enrollees.248  
Second, CMS could be tasked with greater responsibility for ensuring 
that benefits are provided as promised.249  And third, Congress could 
write the long-missing cause of action into the Medicaid Act.250  The 
remedies suggested are not intended to be exclusive of one another, 
nor exhaustive.  These proposed remedies simply provide a starting 
point for exploring appropriate protections.  The National Governors’ 
Association recently asked Congress to end private causes of action in 
providing suggestions for Medicaid reform; Congress did not choose 
to incorporate this request into the DRA.251  One could infer that 
 
 246 See BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW:  CASES, MATERIALS & PROBLEMS 844-45 
(6th ed. 2008). 
 247 See, e.g., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID:  OVERVIEW 
AND IMPACT OF NEW REGULATIONS 4-5 (2008), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/ 
upload/7739.pdf; see also H.R. 5613, 110th Cong. § 5 (2008) (preventing CMS from 
implementing rules to address problem of state overcharges by capping payments at cost 
of covering Medicaid enrollees); Medicaid Financing:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. (2008) (describing past 
efforts by CMS to prevent states from overcharging Medicaid through inter-
governmental transfers); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE DEP’T OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2007 AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT, MANAGEMENT ISSUE 4:  
MEDICAID ADMINISTRATION 8-10 (2008), http://www.oig.hhs.gov/publications/ 
challenges/files/TM_Challenges07.pdf.  The Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) 
notes that once states receive federal funds for their Medicaid programs, those funds can 
be reallocated easily to non-Medicaid purposes through inter-governmental transfers 
that the OIG cannot trace.  See id. at 7-8.  Intra-governmental seems the correct 
terminology given that the improper transfers occur within the state government, but 
this is the term as defined by the OIG.  See id.  The OIG states that six states obtained 
more than $3 billion in Medicaid funding by “requiring providers operated by units of 
government, such as county-owned nursing homes, to return Medicaid payments to 
State governments through [inter-governmental transfers].”  Id. at 7. 
 248 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 249 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 250 See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 251 See NAT’L GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, supra note 59, at § 16.2.5.  The NGA made multiple 
suggestions for reforming Medicaid, including some provisions that Congress adopted 
as part of the DRA.  See id. §§ 16.2.2, 16.2.3.  The states suggested in section 16.2.5, 
Judicial Reforms, that states have a “right” to “manage the optional Medicaid 
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Congress continues to find the private enforcement mechanism 
appropriate and useful, and that the following suggestions could find 
some political traction.252 
1. Individual Administrative Remedies 
Limited administrative remedies exist within the Medicaid Act that 
apply to narrow circumstances, such as denial of enrollment to 
Medicaid applicants and mechanisms for Medicaid healthcare 
providers to contest payment rates.253  Medicaid could be structured to 
include administrative remedies that mirror those provided in the 
Medicare statutory scheme.254  A model already exists for this type of 
administrative process that would make its implementation reasonably 
straightforward.255  And, administrative hearings (and resolutions) can 
be faster and less expensive than judicial remedies, which is important 
in the context of healthcare. 
On the other hand, exhaustion of administrative remedies can be 
burdensome, particularly in the medical context where every level of 
administrative review before reaching a courthouse means more time 
that access to healthcare services or payment for those services is 
denied.256  The model of Medicare beneficiaries’ detailed 
administrative process leads eventually to judicial intervention, 
however, and thus other remedies must be considered for both 
expediency and efficiency.257  Avoiding administrative exhaustion 
requirements may become even more important in light of the 
Benchmark Provision and looming limits on judicial remedies for all 
beneficiaries of Spending Programs.  Also, allowing enrollees and 
 
categories . . . and the federal government should remove legal barriers that impede 
this fundamental management tool.”  Id. § 16.2.5.  The preliminary report regarding 
Medicaid reform stated more assertively:  “Federal reforms are needed to constrain the 
broad ability of judicial decrees in Medicaid cases that clearly impede state innovation 
and reform.”  NAT’L GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, MEDICAID REFORM:  A PRELIMINARY REPORT 8 
(2005), http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0506medicaid.pdf. 
 252 Congress has rejected repeated attempts to limit the scope of § 1983 to permit 
causes of action for civil rights laws, which supports this inference.  See Key, supra 
note 65, at 313 (noting that Senator Hatch introduced legislation three times to so 
limit § 1983 and was rebuffed each time). 
 253 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (2006) (providing hearing for those denied medical 
assistance or for whom application is not acted upon with “reasonable promptness”); 
42 C.F.R. § 447.253(e) (2008). 
 254 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (2006). 
 255 See id. 
 256 See JOST, supra note 4, at 34-36. 
 257 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(1)(A). 
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providers to have causes of action, whether administrative or judicial 
in nature, could help to prevent gaming of the federal match, which 
federal agencies have a difficult time detecting. 
2. Agency Oversight 
A related remedy could require CMS to police individual access and 
provider rates in such a way that private causes of action are not 
necessary.258  Though CMS exercises no such oversight currently, 
DHHS engages in other forms of administrative supervision, including 
administrative processes for disgruntled Medicare enrollees (described 
above) and an extensive, and lucrative, fraud watch over federal 
healthcare programs.259  The latter programs provide a framework for 
creating greater CMS oversight of Medicaid, as the federal government 
and the states, through Medicaid Fraud Control Units, work together 
to catch fraud that funnels federal dollars away from their designated 
programs.260  In this vein, the DRA strengthened Medicaid integrity 
initiatives by creating a Comprehensive Medicaid Integrity Plan and 
channeling additional money into CMS to help states “combat fraud, 
waste and abuse in the Medicaid program.”261  Even though states 
primarily are responsible for fraud prosecution through their Medicaid 
Fraud Control Units, the DRA gives CMS the power and money to 
provide “technical assistance, guidance and oversight” in states’ fraud 
control efforts.262  This new fraud provision provides an example of 
political will finding a way.  Though Medicaid can be politically 
fragile, its financial integrity is still a priority to Congress and CMS.  
Perhaps protecting enrollees and participating providers should be 
viewed as forms of program integrity too. 
 
 258 See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America v. Walsh:  The Supreme Court Allows the States to Proceed with Expanding 
Access to Drugs, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 69, 79-82 (2004) (noting that 
justices, in different pieces of decision, signaled interest in having DHHS resolve 
Medicaid disputes). 
 259 This is a result of fraud-prosecution support provisions contained in the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.  See Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, §§ 201-05, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
 260 See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICAID FRAUD & ABUSE — 
GENERAL INFORMATION (2008), www.cms.hhs.gov/MDFraudAbuseGenInfo; OFFICE OF 
THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, APR.-SEPT. 2007, at 27-33, http://www.oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/ 
semiannual/2007/SemiannualFinal2007.pdf. 
 261 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 260. 
 262 Id. 
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3. Statutory “Clarity” 
Congress could write a cause of action into the Medicaid Act, which 
it assumes exists by virtue of § 1983.263  The § 1983 cause of action, 
though, is not only fragile but also malleable and thus inherently not 
as protective as an unambiguous, statutorily-provided private cause of 
action would be.264  Also, writing a cause of action into Medicaid 
would provide the “clear notice” to states that Arlington required (and 
arguably Gonzaga) so that states can be held liable for failure to 
provide promised benefits by not only the federal government but also 
enrollees and healthcare providers.265  In addition, Congress must 
either modify (or repeal) the Benchmark Provision, or it must ensure 
that any statutory causes of action are explicitly recognized in states 
with Benchmark plans. 
States likely would protest the addition of a statutory cause of 
action.  One of the reasons that states have pushed for amendments to 
Medicaid is that they have craved freedom from judicial review.266  
But, states will ignore the demands of the Medicaid Act if possible, so 
allowing them to be unaccountable except for agency oversight, as 
suggested above, is not ideal.  One benefit of § 1983 causes of action 
for Medicaid enrollees has been the relative ease of access to federal 
courthouses; compared to Medicare, which requires administrative 
exhaustion in most instances, Medicaid enrollees have had fewer 
procedural hurdles (though being impoverished and in poor health are 
limiting factors, to be sure).267  Congress should recognize the Court’s 
ongoing interest in clear statement rules when drafting a Medicaid 
private enforcement action, especially given new precedents such as 
Arlington.268  Arlington signals the Court’s interest in reining in federal 
spending legislation while protecting states’ interests, which in the 
 
 263 See JOST, supra note 4, at 95 (describing history of “Suter fix” and how it 
demonstrated Congress’s intent to incorporate decisions such as Thiboutot and Wilder 
into federal statutory scheme). 
 264 Jost, supra note 14, at 152.  Professor Jost recommends that Congress should at 
least “explicitly recognize the federal right of action to enforce federal Medicaid 
requirements that it has long assumed exists.”  Id. 
 265 See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006) 
(setting forth “clear notice” test for conditions on federal monies accepted by states in 
cooperative federalism programs); see also Huberfeld, supra note 75, at 470.   
 266 See, e.g., NAT’L GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, SHORT-RUN MEDICAID REFORM 9 (2005), 
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0508medicaidreform.pdf (asking, among other things, for 
option of benchmark coverage, for federal government to “remove legal barriers that 
impede” states’ ability to manage Medicaid, and for DHHS to help states that are sued). 
 267 See JOST, supra note 4, at 36. 
 268 548 U.S. 291. 
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Medicaid context includes limiting individuals’ ability to enforce 
conditions on spending against the states through § 1983.   
A more radical means to facilitate enrollee (and provider) safeguards 
would be to create a qui tam relator cause of action and accompanying 
protections within the Medicaid Act.  The goal of facilitating qui tam 
actions (which are sometimes referred to as whistleblower actions), 
whether it be in Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse statutes, 
environmental protection policy, antitrust litigation, or securities 
regulations, generally is to protect the public by permitting 
enforcement through private suits as well as public prosecutions.269  
Though CMS has not made protecting Medicaid enrollees a high 
priority, the dual-track method of protection that is facilitated by qui 
tam actions could help CMS to institute stronger protections for 
Medicaid beneficiaries.270  These actions would enhance scrutiny of 
states as they implement conditions on federal spending and would 
help Medicaid enrollees by facilitating their causes of action from both 
a procedural and a monetary perspective. 
Congress could limit qui tam actions by permitting standing only 
for enrollees and providers who have suffered direct injury from the 
state’s actions or omissions, rather than allowing any state citizen to 
bring a cause of action regardless of harm (in contrast with the qui 
tam relator provisions of the civil False Claims Act).271  For example, 
antitrust litigation can only be initiated by a party that has been 
harmed directly by the alleged wrongdoing.272  This limits the 
 
 269 See Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases:  Reconciling 
Private Incentives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12 (1995). 
 270 Arguably this could work to protect states, enrollees, and providers alike; 
though sometimes the states align with the federal proposals, states can be harmed by 
changes to the Medicaid program.  See, e.g., Robert Pear, Governors of Both Parties 
Oppose Medicaid Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2008, at A18 (stating that governors 
protested promulgation of new rules for state cost sharing when CMS decided it 
would no longer match states for graduate medical education and other services). 
 271 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2006).  The qui tam provisions of the federal False 
Claims Act allow anyone with direct and independent knowledge of violations of the 
law to bring the information to the government’s attention and file an action on behalf 
of the government.  See 31 U.S.C. § 3730.  No direct injury to the whistleblower is 
necessary for the action to be brought or to be successful; the only requirement is that 
the terms of the statute be violated.  See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex 
rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773, 777-78 (2000) (holding that relator’s interest is tied to 
government’s interest, conferring sufficient Article III standing). 
 272 See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1977) 
(formulating rule for antitrust standing that requires plaintiff be injured in way that 
was intended to be prevented by federal laws at issue); see also Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 15 (1994). 
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misincentives that arise under statutes like the False Claims Act for 
parties to bring actions because they can win the prosecution 
lottery.273  Further, CMS could set up an internal review system to 
ensure that the litigation is consistent with the goals of enabling qui 
tam actions (i.e., protecting Medicaid enrollees and the Medicaid 
program).  An example of this structure exists in Section 7623 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, which provides an award for whistleblowers 
who are original sources for tips to the IRS that lead to recovering 
underpayment of taxes.274  The IRS prosecutes cases after evaluation 
by a newly formed Whistleblower Office, unlike the False Claims Act, 
which allows the qui tam relator to proceed without government 
intervention.275  Under the IRS regulatory scheme, the party providing 
the information need not be harmed, so the example is most useful for 
modeling governmental intervention and oversight.276 
CONCLUSION 
Though Medicaid was created to provide a statutory entitlement to 
states, providers, and enrollees, it has failed to ensure that enrollees 
receive promised benefits, both by lack of agency action and lack of 
statutory enforcement provisions.  DRA § 6044, combined with 
personnel changes on the Supreme Court and the double circuit split, 
likely will continue to narrow enforcement of Medicaid entitlements 
through § 1983 claims if not eliminate them entirely.  We have seen 
already that the Roberts Court will not hesitate to revisit precedent, 
and the Gonzaga decision certainly appears ripe for reconsideration 
given the multiple interpretations that federal courts have issued.  
Revisiting Gonzaga may result in a severe tightening, if not outright 
elimination, of private causes of action to enforce conditions on 
 
 273 See generally Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem with 
Privatization of Public Enforcement:  The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 281 (2007) (describing empirically phenomenon of over-litigation that has 
occurred under federal False Claims Act, particularly with regard to pharmaceutical 
industry). 
 274 See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406, 120 
Stat. 2922, 2958-59 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 7623 (2007)). 
 275 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730.  The lack of requirement for suffering an injury has lead 
to what Professor Matthew describes as a moral hazard problem, resulting in a glut of 
qui tam relator cases.  See Matthew, supra note 273, at 331-33.  This Article does not 
advocate for such a broad remedy, which Professor Matthew convincingly argues 
opens the courthouse doors too widely.  See id. 
 276 Also, recognizing the doctrine of Ex parte Young, Medicaid beneficiaries would not 
be able to receive monetary damages against the state, but they should receive attorneys’ 
fees and expert witness costs.  See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 148-50 (1908). 
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federal spending provided to the states.  A majority of the currently 
sitting Justices have expressed skepticism that this avenue should be 
open at all.  Congress should act to protect Medicaid and its enrollees. 
In a year of presidential primaries, debates, and soaring political 
dialogue, the bizarre love triangle between Medicaid, Spending Clause 
jurisprudence, and § 1983 also serves as a cautionary tale for federal 
healthcare proposals.  Major candidates described plans for universal 
insurance coverage mandates; a strengthened Medicaid program is 
consistent with this vision.  Weakened Medicaid with greater state 
flexibility has tended to lead to denials of benefits and denial of 
enrollment; this is yet another reason that Congress should take a 
harder look at modifications to the Medicaid Act such as the DRA’s 
Benchmarking Provision, and perhaps even repeal the Benchmarking 
Provision.  Ironically, as soon as the states cried for flexibility in 
Medicaid State plans, they asked for greater federal assistance in 
covering the uninsured by increases in Medicaid matching funds, limits 
on new rules promulgated by CMS that will cut Medicaid funding, and 
increases in State Children’s Health Insurance Program funding.277  
With the number of uninsured at forty-seven million and growing, 
Congress cannot continue to assume that tinkering with Medicaid at the 
expense of enrollees, while assuming that court enforcement will help 
to smooth out any kinks, is a viable arrangement.278 
 
 277 See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., STATES PROMOTED BROADER COVERAGE FOR CHILDREN 
IN 2007, BUT REPORT THAT A DECLINING ECONOMY COUPLED WITH LACK OF SCHIP 
REAUTHORIZATION AND NEW FEDERAL RULES NOW COMPROMISE EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE 
NUMBER OF UNINSURED (2008), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/kcmu012808nr.cfm. 
 278 At least one author is waiting with bated breath for the Court to discontinue 
enforcement of Spending Clause legislation through § 1983.  See William H. Pryor, Jr., 
The Demand for Clarity:  Federalism, Statutory Construction, and the 2000 Term, 32 
CUMB. L. REV. 361, 372-73 (2002) (writing that district court decision in Westside 
Mothers v. Haveman was “sublime” and stating that spending clause jurisprudence, 
“the area of federalism jurisprudence that has produced the fewest and most 
deferential constitutional standards[,] may offer the best hope for the next landmark 
decisions” and may soon move in Blessing concurrence direction). 
